The Psychology of Scientific Explanation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Philosophers agree that scientific explanations aim to produce understanding , and that good ones succeed in this aim. But few seriously consider what understanding is, or what the cues are when we have it. If it is a psychological state or process, describing its specific nature is the job of psychological theorizing. This article examines the role of understanding in scientific explanation. It warns that the seductive, phenomenological sense of understanding is often, but mistakenly, viewed as a cue of genuine understanding. The article closes with a discussion of several new paths of research that tie the psychology of scientific explanation to cognate notions of learning, testimony, and understanding.
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Cites
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Cited by
Abdul, A., Vermeulen, J., Wang, D., Lim, B. Y., & Kankanhalli, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3173574.3174156 · Cited by 743
No understanding without explanation
Strevens, M. (2013) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.12.005 · Cited by 355
Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge
Khalifa, K. (2017) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108164276 · Cited by 331
The Instrumental Value of Explanations
Lombrozo, T. (2011) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00413.x · Cited by 118
How to Mitigate the Hard Problem by Adopting the Dual Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
Polák, M., & Marvan, T. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02837 · Cited by 30
Metadata
- Authors
- Trout, J. D.
- Venue
- Philosophy Compass
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-04-13
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 564-591
- ISSN
- 1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2054622147
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 16.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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