The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Instrumental Value of Explanations
Abstract
Scientific and ‘intuitive’ or ‘folk’ theories are typically characterized as serving three critical functions: prediction, explanation, and control. While prediction and control have clear instrumental value, the value of explanation is less transparent. This paper reviews an emerging body of research from the cognitive sciences suggesting that the process of seeking, generating, and evaluating explanations in fact contributes to future prediction and control, albeit indirectly by facilitating the discovery and confirmation of instrumentally valuable theories. Theoretical and empirical considerations also suggest why explanations may nonetheless feel intrinsically valuable. The paper concludes by considering some implications of the psychology of explanation for a naturalized philosophy of explanation.
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“Philosophical and empirical research has converged on the thesis that we are particularly interested in causal explanations because they provide us with reliable means to affect and predict our surroundings”
From AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy (2022) · cites this paper as Lombrozo, 2011
Citations
Cites
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Conceptual Change in Childhood
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Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392759 · Cited by 3,179
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286983 · Cited by 3,174
Eliciting Self‐Explanations Improves Understanding
Michelene, T. H., Leeuw, N. D., Chiu, M., & Lavancher, C. (1994) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1016/0364-0213(94)90016-7 · Cited by 2,492
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Craik K, 1943, The Nature of Explanations
- 10.1037/0033-2909.110.3.499 · DOI · Paper page
- Lagnado D.The Psychology of Explanation: A Bayesian Approach.’Masters Thesis Schools of Psychology and Computer Science University of Birmingham 1994.
- Woodward J, 2010, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition)
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Langer, M., Oster, D., Speith, T., Hermanns, H., Kästner, L., Schmidt, E., Sesing, A., & Baum, K. (2021) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103473 · Cited by 652
Expanding Explainability: Towards Social Transparency in AI systems
Ehsan, U., Liao, Q. V., Muller, M., Riedl, M. O., & Weisz, J. D. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3411764.3445188 · Cited by 538
Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double Standard?
Zerilli, J., Knott, A., Maclaurin, J., & Gavaghan, C. (2019) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-018-0330-6 · Cited by 420
Langer, M., & Landers, R. N. (2021) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2021.106878 · Cited by 338
Explanatory Preferences Shape Learning and Inference
Lombrozo, T. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.08.001 · Cited by 229
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Lombrozo, T.
- Affiliations
- University of California System (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lombrozo, Tania
- ORCID
- Lombrozo, Tania
- Venue
- Philosophy Compass
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-08
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 539-551
- ISSN
- 1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1903964690
- Cited by
- 118
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 4
- FWCI
- 14.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy Compass (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Keywords
- explanation, prediction, control, folk theories, scientific theories, cognitive science, theory evaluation
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