Trust but verify? Voluntary regulation programs in the nonprofit sector
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this article we examine how information problems can cause agency slippages and lead to governance failures in nonprofit organizations. Drawing on the principal–agent literature, we provide a theoretical account of an institutional mechanism, namely, voluntary regulation programs, to mitigate such slippages. These programs seek to impose obligations on their participants regarding internal governance and use of resources. By joining these programs, nonprofit organizations seek to differentiate themselves from nonparticipants and signal to their principals that they are deploying resources as per the organizational mandate. If principals are assured that agency slippages are lower in program participants, they might be more likely to provide the participants with resources to deliver goods and services to their target populations. However, regulatory programs for nonprofit organizations are of variable quality and, in some cases, could be designed to obscure rather than reveal information. We outline an analytical framework to differentiate the credible clubs from the “charity washes.” A focus on the institutional architecture of these programs can help to predict their efficacy in reducing agency problems.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Ostrom, E. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511807763 · Cited by 20,653
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective
Gunningham, N., & Rees, J. (1997) · Law & Policy · doi:10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033 · Cited by 572 · cited 1×
“As an instrument of social control, in the for-profit sector, such communitarian regulation tends to emerge at the level of industry (Gunningham & Rees 1997) , a phenomenon that holds for the nonprofit sector as well.”
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Cited by
The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion
Jordana, J., Levi-Faur, D., & i Marín, X. F. (2011) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414011407466 · Cited by 321
Metadata
- Authors
- Prakash, A., & Gugerty, M. K.
- Venue
- Regulation & Governance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-03
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 22-47
- ISSN
- 1748-5983 (ISSN-L)
- 1748-5991
- OpenAlex
- W2148701016
- Cited by
- 193
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 26.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Prakash, A., & Gugerty, M. K. (2010). Trust but verify? Voluntary regulation programs in the nonprofit sector. Regulation & Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2009.01067.x
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