The Role of the Theory‐of‐Mind Cortical Network in the Comprehension of Narratives
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Narrative comprehension rests on the ability to understand the intentions and perceptions of various agents in a story who interact with respect to some goal or problem. Reasoning about the state of mind of another person, real or fictional, has been referred to as Theory of Mind processing. While Theory of Mind processing was first postulated prior to the existence of neuroimaging research, fMRI studies make it possible to characterize this processing in some detail. We propose that narrative comprehension makes use of some of the neural substrate of Theory of Mind reasoning, evoking what is referred to as a protagonist perspective network. The main cortical components of this protagonist‐based network are the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the right temporo‐parietal junction. The article discusses how these two cortical centers interact in narrative comprehension but still play distinguishable roles, and how the interaction between the two centers is disrupted in individuals with autism.
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Cites
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
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“These attributed internal mental states can be intentions, feelings, beliefs, and emotions, among others (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985, Baron-Cohen 1988; Happé 1993; Tager-Flusberg 1993; Saxe, Carey and Kanwisher 2004).”
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People thinking about thinking peopleThe role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”
Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00230-1 · Cited by 2,316 · cited 5×
“The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex may flag and keep track of possible intention-related inferences, whereas the right temporo-parietal junction may be more involved with reasoning about particular mental states (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialDevelopment and neurophysiology of mentalizing
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 · Cited by 2,306 · cited 4×
“Saxe and Wexler (2005) presented stories that varied across several attributes (familiar versus foreign background; normal behavior versus norm-violating behavior; character was satisfied versus character was not satisfied).”
BackgroundInfluentialFunctional imaging of ‘theory of mind’
Gallagher, H. L., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)00025-6 · Cited by 2,092 · cited 4×
“Gallagher and Frith (2003) proposed that the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex is the primary component of Theory of Mind reasoning, and that the right temporo-parietal junction simply provides the cues that are the input to the mentalizing (the reasoning about the mental state of another person).”
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“The research demonstrating the activation of the dorsomedial prefrontal area in discourse processing shows just how informative neuroimaging research has been about discourse processing, but it also shows the limitations of the approach.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluential
Cited by
The Neural Bases of Social Cognition and Story Comprehension
Mar, R. A. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145406 · Cited by 950
The Neurobiology of Language Beyond Single Words
Hagoort, P., & Indefrey, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-013847 · Cited by 407
Murray, R. J., Schaer, M., & Debbané, M. (2012) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.013 · Cited by 305
Reading fiction and reading minds: the role of simulation in the default network
Tamir, D. I., Bricker, A. B., Dodell-Feder, D., & Mitchell, J. P. (2016) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsv114 · Cited by 212
The core and beyond in the language-ready brain
Hagoort, P. (2017) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.01.048 · Cited by 150
Metadata
- Authors
- Mason, R. A., & Just, M. A.
- Venue
- Language and Linguistics Compass
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 157-174
- ISSN
- 1749-818X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2105897147
- Cited by
- 98
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 6.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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