The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma
Open accessAbstract
Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous.Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted.Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion?Or does it recommend that members individually vote on the premises, and then let their commitment to the conclusion be settled by whether or not the group endorses the required premises?Is deliberative democracy to enforce the discipline of reason at the individual level, as in the first possibility, or at the collective level, as in the second?Deliberative-democratic theory has not addressed this issue, perhaps because of an implicit assumption that it does not matter whether the discipline of reason is imposed at the individual or at the collective level.But that assumption is false and there is no excuse for neglecting the issue raised.The discursive dilemma of my title-a generalisation of the doctrinal paradox that has re-
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Cites
The theory of communicative action
(2014) · The Philosophy of Habermas · doi:10.4324/9781315710495-5 · Cited by 8,634
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Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
The theory of communicative action
(2005) · The Philosophy of Habermas · doi:10.1017/upo9781844653539.007 · Cited by 2,271
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Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics
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Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science
Dryzek, J. S. (1990) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781139173810 · Cited by 1,181
Cited by
The Place of Self‐Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy*
Mansbridge, J., Bohman, J., Chambers, S., Estlund, D., Føllesdal, A., Fung, A., Lafont, C., Manin, B., & Martí, J. L. (2010) · Journal of Political Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00344.x · Cited by 1,022
On the people's terms: a republican theory and model of democracy
(2013) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.51-1150 · Cited by 748
Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result
List, C., & Pettit, P. (2002) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267102001098 · Cited by 619
Self-citationHandbook of Computational Social Choice
Moulin, H. (2016) · HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107446984 · Cited by 408
Akrasia, Collective and Individual
Pettit, P. (2003) · Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality · doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0004 · Cited by 32
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pettit, P.
- Venue
- Philosophical Issues
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001-10
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 268-299
- ISSN
- 1533-6077 (ISSN-L)
- 1758-2237
- OpenAlex
- W2007189251
- Cited by
- 334
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 21.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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