The effects of line‐of‐business reporting on competition in oligopoly settings*
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This study considers the welfare effects of line‐of‐business (LOB) reporting by firms operating in imperfectly competitive markets. The analysis is based on a two‐period model in which a multisegment firm, labeled the incumbent, operates as a monopolist in two markets in the first period and then competes against an entrant in each of the two markets in the second period. The incumbent obtains private information in the first period. LOB reporting fully reveals that information to the entrants; aggregate reporting only partially reveals the incumbent's information. The second‐period consequences on firms and consumers parallel results previously available from the information‐sharing literature. These results serve to explain why some firms opposed the imposition of LOB reporting by accounting rule‐making bodies. The incumbent may distort first‐period production in an attempt to influence entrant beliefs. However, such distortions lower the incumbent's expected first‐period profit and result in no gains in the second period. Nonetheless, in equilibrium, these distortions cannot be avoided unless the entrants observe the incumbent's first‐period production or prices, suggesting a role for nonfinancial disclosures in accounting reports. Résumé. Les auteurs se penchent sur l'effet «protecteur» de la communication d'informations relatives au secteur d'activité par les entreprises qui exercent leurs activités sur des marchés imparfaitement concurrentiels. L'analyse est fondée sur un modèle comportant deux périodes, dans lequel une entreprise oeuvrant dans plusieurs secteurs d'activité‐désignée sous l'appellation d'entreprise installée—exerce un monopole dans deux marchés au cours de la première période et doit ensuite livrer concurrence à un nouveau venu dans chacun des deux marchés au cours de la seconde période. L'entreprise installée obtient de l'information privilégiée au cours de la première période. L'information sectorielle livre intégralement cette information aux nouveaux venus, mais l'information consolidée ne révèle qu'une partie de l'information dont dispose l'entreprise installée. Les résultats de la seconde période pour les entreprises et les consommateurs s'apparentent à ceux qui ont été exposés jusqu'à maintenant dans les écrits relatifs au partage d'informations. Ces résultats viennent expliquer pourquoi certaines entreprises se sont opposées à ce que les organismes de réglementation comptable fassent de la présentation de l'information sectorielle une obligation. L'entreprise installée peut «biaiser» l'information relative à la première période dans l'intention d'influer sur les convictions des nouveaux venus. Ces distorsions diminueront cependant le profit espéré par l'entreprise installée au cours de la première période et se traduiront par des gains nuls au cours de la seconde période. Néanmoins, en situation d'équilibre, ces distorsions ne peuvent être évitées, à moins que les nouveaux venus n'observent la production ou les prix de l'entreprise installée au cours de la première période, ce qui permet de croire que la présentation d'informations non financières dans les rapports comptables a un rôle à jouer.
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Citations
Cites
Voluntary financial disclosure in an entry game with continua of types*
FELTHAM, G. A., & XIE, J. Z. (1992) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.1992.tb00869.x · Cited by 198
Self-citation
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Berger, P. G., & Ofek, E. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00798-6 · Cited by 3,061
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00025-8 · Cited by 2,303
LEUZ, C., & WYSOCKI, P. D. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12115 · Cited by 1,760
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Villalonga, B. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00640.x · Cited by 814
Leuz, C., & Wysocki, P. D. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1105398 · Cited by 690
Metadata
- Authors
- FELTHAM, G. A., GIGLER, F. B., & HUGHES, J. S.
- Venue
- Contemporary Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1992-09
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-23
- ISSN
- 0823-9150 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-3846
- OpenAlex
- W2001824935
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 13.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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