Cited by 376Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceScientific Research and Philosophical Inquiry

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 13 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data?

Open access
FLORIDI, LUCIANO·2005·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Abstract

There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Floridi argues that the Standard Definition of Information (SDI) as well-formed, meaningful data gives only necessary but insufficient conditions for semantic information, because truth-values do not supervene on information and misinformation is pseudo-information rather than a type of information. He revises SDI into RSDI by adding a fourth, necessary truth-condition, aligning with the Dretske–Grice approach.

Key findings

  • SDI is formulated as: σ is DOS (declarative, objective, semantic) information iff (1) σ consists of n data (d), n ≥ 1; (2) the data are well-formed; (3) the well-formed data are meaningful. Floridi holds these are necessary but not sufficient.
  • The paper rejects alethic neutrality (AN) — the claim that meaningful, well-formed data qualify as information regardless of truth-value — and with it the consequences that false information (FI) is a genuine type of information, that tautologies qualify as information (TA), and that "it is true that σ" is non-redundant (TI).
  • Nine proposed reasons for treating false information as a type of semantic information (FI.1–FI.9) are each argued to be unconvincing; two positive arguments are given that misinformation is pseudo-information: (a) "false" in "false information" is attributive and negative, so the compound fails the splitting test (unlike "digital information"), and (b) if false information counted as information, semantic erosion by operators like "not" would be inexplicable.
  • The revised definition (RSDI) adds a fourth condition: the meaningful, well-formed data are truthful. Five areas of application are listed, including critique of deflationary theories of truth, mathematical/analytic propositions, empty names, the standard definition of knowledge, and a quantitative theory of semantic information based on truth-values and degrees of discrepancy rather than probability distributions.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis, not empirical: the paper works within situation logic (Israel and Perry; Devlin), using the symbol σ and the term "infon" for discrete items of information irrespective of semiotic code or physical implementation.
  • The argument proceeds by (i) formalising SDI and its four endorsed neutralities (typological, taxonomic, ontological, genetic), (ii) rejecting the fifth, alethic neutrality, (iii) rebutting nine reasons for counting false information as information, and (iv) supplying two constructive arguments that it is pseudo-information.
  • Illustrative examples are used throughout (e.g. a dinner-guests scenario, a "false constable," the EREP CD-ROM database, Poe's raven as a unary device, hieroglyphics before the Rosetta Stone).

Limitations

  • Stated by the paper: the rejection of TA (tautologies as information) is not pursued because it is "crucially connected to the interpretation of mathematical and analytic truths" and is left to another paper; arguments against AN based on deflationary theories of truth and a criticism of TI are also deferred as beyond the paper's scope.
  • Stated by the paper: the analysis is deliberately restricted to declarative, objective and semantic (DOS) information; non-declarative uses of "information" (stipulations, invitations, orders, instructions, game moves, music files, digital paintings) and the mathematical/pragmatic senses tied to uncertainty, probability and decision utility are explicitly excluded.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is conceptual and illustrative rather than empirical, resting on linguistic intuitions (e.g. the attributive/predicative test, the "false constable" analogy) and on the plausibility of the semantic-erosion argument, with no data or formal proof offered for the central claim.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00531.x

Cites

44 of 44 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

44 Own interpretation · 3 Not checked yet · 3 No basis given · 2 Sources not found · 1 Partly supported · accuracy not yet measured

Show all 24 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 26
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 8
29 of 29
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is supposed to be correctly qualifiable alethically.

    “where objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is suppose to be correctly qualifiable alethically.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The reasons considered in the paper are the main reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information.

    “none of the main reasons that could be adduced for interpreting false information as a type of information is convincing”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The rejection of FI alone is sufficient to force a revision of AN and hence of SDI.

    “For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of this article only the rejection of FI will be pursued”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Sources of information are usually supposed to be truth-oriented or truth-tracking by default.

    “sources of information are usually supposed to be truth-oriented or truth-tracking by default”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The cloth of semantic information can be, and indeed is, often undone by equally semantic means.

    “We know that the cloth of semantic information can be, and indeed is, often undone by equally semantic means.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Ordinary uses of technical words may be too generic and idiosyncratic, if not incorrect, to provide conceptual guidelines.

    “ordinary uses of technical words may be too generic and idiosyncratic, if not incorrect, to provide conceptual guidelines.”
6 of 6

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

Show all 40 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. T. R. Colburn, 2000 , "Information, Thought, and Knowledge",Proceedings of the World Multiconference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics(Orlando FL, July 23-26, 2000), vol. X, 467 -471 .
  2. Shannon C. E., 1993, Collected Papers

Cited by

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Items 201–300 of 376

Metadata

Authors
FLORIDI, L.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
FLORIDI, LUCIANO
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2005-03
Volume
70
Issue
2
Pages
351-370
ISSN
  • 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-1592
OpenAlex
W2059974307
Cited by
375
References
40
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 17
FWCI
97.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Scientific Research and Philosophical Inquiry
Keywords
semantic information, misinformation, truth conditions, definition of information

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