The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 13 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data?
Open accessAbstract
There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition.
Overview
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Floridi argues that the Standard Definition of Information (SDI) as well-formed, meaningful data gives only necessary but insufficient conditions for semantic information, because truth-values do not supervene on information and misinformation is pseudo-information rather than a type of information. He revises SDI into RSDI by adding a fourth, necessary truth-condition, aligning with the Dretske–Grice approach.
Key findings
- SDI is formulated as: σ is DOS (declarative, objective, semantic) information iff (1) σ consists of n data (d), n ≥ 1; (2) the data are well-formed; (3) the well-formed data are meaningful. Floridi holds these are necessary but not sufficient.
- The paper rejects alethic neutrality (AN) — the claim that meaningful, well-formed data qualify as information regardless of truth-value — and with it the consequences that false information (FI) is a genuine type of information, that tautologies qualify as information (TA), and that "it is true that σ" is non-redundant (TI).
- Nine proposed reasons for treating false information as a type of semantic information (FI.1–FI.9) are each argued to be unconvincing; two positive arguments are given that misinformation is pseudo-information: (a) "false" in "false information" is attributive and negative, so the compound fails the splitting test (unlike "digital information"), and (b) if false information counted as information, semantic erosion by operators like "not" would be inexplicable.
- The revised definition (RSDI) adds a fourth condition: the meaningful, well-formed data are truthful. Five areas of application are listed, including critique of deflationary theories of truth, mathematical/analytic propositions, empty names, the standard definition of knowledge, and a quantitative theory of semantic information based on truth-values and degrees of discrepancy rather than probability distributions.
Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical analysis, not empirical: the paper works within situation logic (Israel and Perry; Devlin), using the symbol σ and the term "infon" for discrete items of information irrespective of semiotic code or physical implementation.
- The argument proceeds by (i) formalising SDI and its four endorsed neutralities (typological, taxonomic, ontological, genetic), (ii) rejecting the fifth, alethic neutrality, (iii) rebutting nine reasons for counting false information as information, and (iv) supplying two constructive arguments that it is pseudo-information.
- Illustrative examples are used throughout (e.g. a dinner-guests scenario, a "false constable," the EREP CD-ROM database, Poe's raven as a unary device, hieroglyphics before the Rosetta Stone).
Limitations
- Stated by the paper: the rejection of TA (tautologies as information) is not pursued because it is "crucially connected to the interpretation of mathematical and analytic truths" and is left to another paper; arguments against AN based on deflationary theories of truth and a criticism of TI are also deferred as beyond the paper's scope.
- Stated by the paper: the analysis is deliberately restricted to declarative, objective and semantic (DOS) information; non-declarative uses of "information" (stipulations, invitations, orders, instructions, game moves, music files, digital paintings) and the mathematical/pragmatic senses tied to uncertainty, probability and decision utility are explicitly excluded.
- Evident from the text: the argument is conceptual and illustrative rather than empirical, resting on linguistic intuitions (e.g. the attributive/predicative test, the "false constable" analogy) and on the plausibility of the semantic-erosion argument, with no data or formal proof offered for the central claim.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
44 Own interpretation · 3 Not checked yet · 3 No basis given · 2 Sources not found · 1 Partly supported · accuracy not yet measured
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“None of these consequences seems ultimately defensible”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is supposed to be correctly qualifiable alethically.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“their rejection forces a revision of AN and hence of SDI.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing”
- Also stated in: § It follows that · p. 10 · hedged
“none of the main reasons that could be adduced for interpreting false information as a type of information is convincing”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: The reasons considered in the paper are the main reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information.
- Also stated in: § It follows that · p. 10 · hedged
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information”
- Also stated in: § It follows that · p. 10 · boosted
“there are compelling reasons to treat false and tautological information as pseudo-information”
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § It follows that · p. 10 · boosted
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · p. 2 · plain
“It follows that SDI needs to be revised by adding a necessary truth-condition.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The rejection of FI alone is sufficient to force a revision of AN and hence of SDI.
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · p. 2 · plain
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“The bipartite account has gained sufficient consensus to become an operational standard in fields that tend to deal with data and information as reified entities”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Davis and Olson (1985)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Silver and Silver (1989)
- Not matchedcites Checkland and Scholes (1990)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Meaning is not (at least not only) in the mind of the user.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information.”
- Also stated in: § 2.1. An Analysis of the Standard Definition of Information · p. 9 · plain
“insofar as SDI provides necessary conditions for σ to qualify as DOS information, it also endorses four types of neutrality: TN, TaxN, ON and GN.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § 2.1. An Analysis of the Standard Definition of Information · p. 9 · plain
- Probably not a substantial claim. 26
- It may state two separate claims as one. 8
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · p. 1 · plain
“recent surveys have shown no consensus on a single, unified definition of semantic information.¹”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Floridi [2002], [2004a], [2005] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 5 (p. 137) says there is no consensus on a single, unified definition of information. It mentions a proposed revision to the definition of semantic information, but does not specifically say there is no consensus on that narrower definition. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · p. 1 · plain
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“ON) no information without data representation.”
plain- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“According to SDI, alethic values are not embedded in, but supervene on semantic information:”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is supposed to be correctly qualifiable alethically.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“TaxN) a datum is a relational entity.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“GN) δ can have a semantics independently of any informee.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The question is whether it is rigorous enough to be applied in the context of an informationtheoretical epistemology. We shall see that this is not the case”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“FI may be coupled to some true, metainformation M that the source of FI is not fully reliable. What now counts as information is the true M, not the false FI.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Over the last three decades, most analyses have supported a definition of DOS information in terms of data + meaning.”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Davis and Olson (1985)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Silver and Silver (1989)
- Not matchedcites Checkland and Scholes (1990)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The standard definition of DOS information (SDI) provides necessary but insufficient conditions for the qualification of data as information.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“it is not the case, and hence it would be a mistake or an act of misinformation to assert, that p constitutes information about the number of natural satellites orbiting around the earth and is also a falsehood.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“misinformation (false information) has turned out to be not a type of information but rather pseudo-information.”
- Also stated in: § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16 · plain
“False information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is not information.”
- Also stated in: § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16 · plain
“[...] false information and mis-information are not kinds of information——any more than decoy ducks and rubber ducks are kinds of ducks.”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Dretske (1981), 45
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Grice (1989), 371
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16 · plain
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“it is not an oxymoron, but a way of specifying that the contents in question do not conform to the situation they purport to map.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
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Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“it also endorses four types of neutrality: TN, TaxN, ON and GN.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The confusion about the nature of false information seems to be generated by a misleading analogy.”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the attributive use can be either positive or negative.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“S.4 is one of the earliest and most popular formulations of SDI”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Bateson (1973)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If false information were a genuine type of information it should pass the splitting test. It does not, so it is not.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“to exchange (receive, sell, buy, etc.) false DOS information about x, e.g. the number of moons orbiting around the earth, is to exchange (receive, sell, buy, etc.) no DOS information at all about x, only meaningful and well-formed data, that is semantic content.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“we ordinarily speak of false information when what we mean is misinformation, i.e. no information at all.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“if they are not truthful, they can only constitute misinformation”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“this merely shows that FI is a compound in which only the true component B qualifies as information.”
plain- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“More recently, the bipartite account has begun to influence the philosophy of computing and information as well”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Chalmers [1996]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Floridi [1999]
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Franklin [1995]
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In conclusion, there seem to be no good reason to treat false information as a type of information.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: Ordinary uses of technical words may be too generic and idiosyncratic, if not incorrect, to provide conceptual guidelines.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“it follows that SDI needs to be modified, to include a fourth condition about the positive alethic nature of the data in question”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“if the mathematical theorem is not correct (if p is false), it must be concluded that Q is misinformed (i.e. not informed) that p (Q does not have any information about the theorem).”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“SDI.3 only requires the δ to be provided with a semantics already.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“a false constable (attributive use) is clearly not a specific type of constable, but not a constable at all (negative use)”
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“DTT may be satisfactory as theories of truth-ascriptions while being inadequate as theories of truthfulness”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
The authors state this as an assumption.
Objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is supposed to be correctly qualifiable alethically.
“where objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is suppose to be correctly qualifiable alethically.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The reasons considered in the paper are the main reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information.
“none of the main reasons that could be adduced for interpreting false information as a type of information is convincing”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The rejection of FI alone is sufficient to force a revision of AN and hence of SDI.
“For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of this article only the rejection of FI will be pursued”
The paper relies on this without support.
Sources of information are usually supposed to be truth-oriented or truth-tracking by default.
“sources of information are usually supposed to be truth-oriented or truth-tracking by default”
The paper relies on this without support.
The cloth of semantic information can be, and indeed is, often undone by equally semantic means.
“We know that the cloth of semantic information can be, and indeed is, often undone by equally semantic means.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Ordinary uses of technical words may be too generic and idiosyncratic, if not incorrect, to provide conceptual guidelines.
“ordinary uses of technical words may be too generic and idiosyncratic, if not incorrect, to provide conceptual guidelines.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“The most articulate defense of VTNN has been offered by Floridi (2005, 2007), who gives two main arguments in support of the thesis that false ''nonnatural information'' is not really information: the argument from splitting and the argument from semantic loss .”
From INFORMATION WITHOUT TRUTH (2010) · cites this paper as Floridi 2005
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“The most articulate defense of VTNN has been offered by Floridi (2005, 2007), who gives two main arguments in support of the thesis that false ''nonnatural information'' is not really information: the argument from splitting and the argument from semantic loss .”
From INFORMATION WITHOUT TRUTH (2010) · cites this paper as Floridi 2005
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 2. The Standard Definition of Information · p. 3
“Chalmers [1996]”
§ References · p. 19
“Chalmers, D. J. 1997, The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press).”
Citations
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Research works printed but not linked: 2
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- Shannon C. E., 1993, Collected Papers
Cited by
Sorted by citations
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Reviewing, Critiquing, Concluding
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Kaur, S. (2015) · Advances in human and social aspects of technology book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-8598-7.ch003
Inconsistency in Ceteris Paribus Imagination
Berto, F. (2016) · Trends in logic · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40220-8_3
Semantic Information and Information Security Definitional Issues
Lundgren, B. (2016) · KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)
Propuesta de una metodología para evaluar el flujo de conocimiento tácito
Rosa, C. P. (2017) · UPCommons institutional repository (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya) · doi:10.5821/dissertation-2117-107942
Yazdani, N., & Moshtaghi, Y. (2018) · Journal of Fundamental and Applied Sciences · doi:10.4314/jfas.v9i2s.841
“Conceptual Model of the Research Information and Higher Anonymity of the Information: the information refers to the data that are sent to the receiver through a significant way (Floridi, 2005, p.2).”
BackgroundInformation, Security, Privacy, and Anonymity : Definitional and Conceptual Issues
Lundgren, B. (2018) · KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)
ISR is Still a Digital Ontology
Long, B. R. (2018) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-018-0041-5
“…conceptually, and ontologically) with Floridi’s strongly semantic theory of information, according to which information reduces on the same transcendental and ontologically neutral basis to data realised as binary nonuniformities de re and differences de re (Floridi 2004, 2005, 2011a).”
BackgroundInformation Ethics: A Critical Assessment
Barker, J. (2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781351300162-1
A Defence of Information Closure
Floridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.003.0007
Self-citationAfterword—Rebooting Philosophy
Floridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.003.0011 · Cited by 1
Self-citationInformational Scepticism and the Logically Possible
Floridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.003.0006
Self-citationPhilosophy as Conceptual Design
Floridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.003.0002
Self-citationConstructionism as Non-naturalism
Floridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.003.0003
Self-citationLogical Fallacies as Bayesian Informational Shortcuts
Floridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.003.0008
Self-citationMaker’s Knowledge, between A Priori and A Posteriori
Floridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.003.0009
Self-citationMultidisciplinary Intel Fusion Technique for Proactive Cyber-Intelligence Model for the IoT
Atasoy, U. C., & Sarı, A. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-18075-1_4
A társadalom empirikus megismerésének információ-konstrukciós folyamata
Előd, Z., & Jelenfi, G. (2019) · JEL-KÉP · doi:10.20520/jel-kep.2019.2.67
Propagação e influência de pós-verdade e fake news na opinião pública
Cardoso, I. D. A. (2019) · Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations (Universidade de São Paulo) · doi:10.11606/d.27.2019.tde-11112019-174743
The Tree of Knowledge: The Normative Structure of Information
Spence, E. H. (2021) · Library of public policy and public administration · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-61612-0_2
Lima, C. O. D. A., & Siebra, S. D. A. (2021)
Promoting the Human Good: The Dual Obligation Wisdom Theory and the Duties of Ethics
Spence, E. H. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-32103-5_18
Carayannis, E. G., & Pirzadeh, A. (2014) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9781137383525_3
Béranger, J. (2015) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119178224.biblio
Spohrer, K. (2015) · Progress in IS · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25163-9_1
Spohrer, K. (2015) · Progress in IS · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25163-9_3
(2016) · Studies in information · doi:10.1108/s2055-53772016032
(2016) · Studies in information · doi:10.1108/s2055-53772016013
(2012) · Library and information science · doi:10.1108/s1876-0562(2012)002012b018
Spohrer, K. (2015) · Progress in IS · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25163-9_2
Spohrer, K. (2015) · Progress in IS · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25163-9_4
Spohrer, K. (2015) · Progress in IS · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25163-9_6
The Logic of Design as a Conceptual Logic of Information
Floridi, L. (2017) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.003.0010 · Cited by 6
Self-citationKopetz, H. (2022) · SpringerBriefs in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-96329-3_1
(2013) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-1-84334-659-3.50021-9
Luciano Floridi’s Metaphysical Theory of Information Ethics
Spence, E. H. (2011) · IGI Global eBooks · doi:10.4018/978-1-61350-465-9.ch009
Expert systems and reporting systems
Tomić, B. (2012) · doi:10.2298/bg20120516tomic
(2016) · Studies in information · doi:10.1108/s2055-53772016006
DOIT, A Process for Normative Analysis
Elliott, D. L., & Spence, E. H. (2017) · doi:10.1002/9781118968888.ch5
Representaciones como sistemas
Céspedes, E. (2022) · ArtefaCToS Revista de estudios sobre la ciencia y la tecnología · doi:10.14201/art20221112337
Research on Video Falsity Detection Based on Publisher and Publishing Environment Features
Xiao, X., Li, X., Yao, J., Li, S., & Anwar, B. (2022) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-06791-4_5
(2006) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-1-84334-159-8.50016-0
Links and clicks: exporting Chinas influence through the web
Nunes, M. C. M. L. (2022) · Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations (Universidade de São Paulo) · doi:10.11606/d.101.2022.tde-25112022-124535
Relativistické skúmanie sémantickej informácie
Sadloň, D. (2023) · Filozofia · doi:10.31577/filozofia.2023.78.3.1
“Jadro tejto diskusie vyjadruje prijatie určitého postoja k Floridiho téze o pravdivosti informácie (pozri Floridi 2005, 2007).”
influência de bots em processos informacionais na área de saúde
Lima, C. O. D. A., & Siebra, S. D. A. (2021) · Asklepion Informação em Saúde · doi:10.21728/asklepion.2021v1n1.p85-103
Alternate Facts: Causes and Implications of the Information Pandemic
Kayany, J. M. (2022) · Journal of Global Communication · doi:10.5958/0976-2442.2022.00008.8
The bioethical implications of chatbots in the medical field: the ChatGPT case
Maccaro, A., Corti, L., & Bertolaso, M. (2023) · Bioethics Update · doi:10.24875/bup.23000003
Knowledge: Making a Quality Choice
Sánchez, A. (2022) · International Conference on Computational Science and Computational Intelligence (CSCI) · doi:10.1109/csci58124.2022.00372
LUCIANO FLORIDI E A ÉTICA DA INFORMAÇÃO: DESAFIOS ATUAIS
DUARTE, D. (2023) · Navegando Publicações eBooks · doi:10.29388/978-65-6070-021-5
Floridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.002.0007
Self-citationFloridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.002.0003
Self-citationFloridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.002.0008
Self-citationFloridi, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833635.002.0005
Self-citationBarbounakis, I. S., & Ritas, A. G. (2024) · International Conference in Electronic Engineering & Information Technology (EEITE) · doi:10.1109/eeite61750.2024.10654411
“Finally only the semantic features are transmitted, reducing the required communication resources significantly [11]–[13].”
BackgroundDichotomy or Continuum: Grice's Distinction between Natural and Nonnatural Meaning
Demir, M. H. (2024) · Felsefe Dünyası · doi:10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1555865
Hu, X., Hao, J., Yi, Q., et al. (2025) · Frontiers in Medicine · doi:10.3389/fmed.2025.1542737
“Repeated convolution and pooling operations further contribute to semantic information loss (31, 32), resulting in overly large or missing boundaries in microvasculature segmentation (33, 34).”
Offenhuber, D. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198907077.003.0020 · Cited by 1
The Informational Analogy and the Rna WorldPreprint
Herrerías, C. G. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5277531
Wisdom and Well-Being: A Wisdom Theory Model
Spence, E. H. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-93883-2_2
The Informational Turn in Philosophy
Chen, M. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-90639-8_2
Invisibilidade: característica do profissional da informação e dos equipamentos informacionais
Júnior, O. F. D. A., & Rabello, R. (2025) · Revista Interamericana de Bibliotecología · doi:10.17533/udea.rib.v48n3e360064
“Nesse contexto, ela – a informação, seja em sua forma “semântica”, amparada por uma verdade contingencial (Floridi, 2005 e se constitui com características tradicionais ou con-servadoras, amanhã poderá ser questionada no sentido de dirimir tais características, podendo, inclusive, ser modificada…”
(2014) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/book-978-1-62396-794-920251008
Hellberg, B. (2006) · KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)
A pilot study of meaning of information in information systems based on Heidegger's work on 'being'
Cang, P., & Wang, S. (2009) · International Conference on Circuits
The Post-Factual Polity of Administration, Ethics, Governance, and Public Policy
(2024) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/979-8-88730-661-220251002
da Silva, L. J. B. F. (2026) · Revista Gênero e Interdisciplinaridade · doi:10.51249/gei.v7i01.2795
Simon, M., & Khafif, D. (2026) · Lecture notes in business information processing · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-14518-5_18
CERTAINTY AS A CONDITION OF POSSIBILITY FOR ALL CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY
da Silva, L. J. B. F. (2026) · Revista Gênero e Interdisciplinaridade · doi:10.51249/gei.v7i02.2918
Enjeux éthiques de l'apprentissage automatique et du Big Data : une perspective herméneutique
Demichelis, R. (2023) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/c644fb5azca2bz4644zbed6z0e4f6b41dfe0
Normative Information. Bridging Information Theory and the Philosophy of Normativity
Lorini, G., & Moroni, S. (2026) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-026-01110-8
“Other subsequent interesting works include Floridi (2003, 2004, 2005, 2010); Cevolani (2011); D’Alfonso (2011); Sequoiah-Grayson and Floridi (2022).”
Shkurov, Y., Zaitseva, S., & Severynchyk, О. P. (2026) · Bulletin of Lviv Polytechnic National University journalism · doi:10.23939/sjs2026.02.001
The causal efficacy of consciousness: a neuroscientific analysis and explanation
Ukachoke, C. (2026) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2026.1849369
“…Emotional Mind (MEM) (Galus and Starzyk, 2020; Galus, 2022, 2025), and The Basic 5 Information is physical in the sense that it is always tied to a physical object (Landauer, 1996, 1999; Floridi, 2005; Deutsch and Marletto, 2015; Dubrovsky, 2019; Krzanowski, 2020), which is under physical laws.”
Suleimenov, I. E., & Bakirov, A. (2026) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies11050187
Metadata
- Authors
- FLORIDI, L.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- FLORIDI, LUCIANO
- ORCID
- FLORIDI, LUCIANO
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-03
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 351-370
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2059974307
- Semantic Scholar
- 2af4a76b5eac94619fac8f2a44d008de8f94d58a
- Cited by
- 375
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 17
- FWCI
- 97.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Scientific Research and Philosophical Inquiry
- Keywords
- semantic information, misinformation, truth conditions, definition of information
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-28, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-28 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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