Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence*
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I argue that we can reconcile two seemingly incompatible traditions for thinking about concepts. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists assume that the systematic redeployment of representational abilities suffices for having concepts. On the other hand, a long philosophical tradition maintains that language is necessary for genuinely conceptual thought. I argue that on a theoretically useful and empirically plausible concept of ‘concept’, it is necessary and sufficient for conceptual thought that a thinker be able to entertain many of the potential thoughts produced by recombining her representational abilities apart from a direct confrontation with the states of affairs being represented. Such representational abilities support a cognitive engagement with the world that is flexible, abstract, and active.
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Cites
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Cited by
Representation in Cognitive Science
Shea, N. (2018) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198812883.001.0001 · Cited by 676
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
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Quilty-Dunn, J., Porot, N., & Mandelbaum, E. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22002849 · Cited by 205
On the need for embodied and dis-embodied cognition
Dove, G. (2011) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00242 · Cited by 113
Mikhalevich, I., Powell, R., & Logan, C. (2017) · Interface Focus · doi:10.1098/rsfs.2016.0121 · Cited by 76
Metadata
- Authors
- CAMP, E.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-02-25
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 275-311
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2053621600
- Cited by
- 153
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 3.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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