The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Coordination of Supply Chains with Risk‐Averse Agents
Abstract
The extant supply chain management literature has not addressed the issue of coordination in supply chains involving risk‐averse agents. We take up this issue and begin with defining a coordinating contract as one that results in a Pareto‐optimal solution acceptable to each agent. Our definition generalizes the standard one in the risk‐neutral case. We then develop coordinating contracts in three specific cases: (i) the supplier is risk neutral and the retailer maximizes his expected profit subject to a downside risk constraint; (ii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own mean‐variance trade‐off; and (iii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own expected utility. Moreover, in case (iii), we show that our contract yields the Nash Bargaining solution. In each case, we show how we can find the set of Pareto‐optimal solutions, and then design a contract to achieve the solutions. We also exhibit a case in which we obtain Pareto‐optimal sharing rules explicitly, and outline a procedure to obtain Pareto‐optimal solutions.
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Cites
Theory of games and economic behavior
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Nash, J. F. (1950) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907266 · Cited by 7,840
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Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments
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Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
Pratt, J. W. (1964) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913738 · Cited by 4,874
Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
Pratt, J. W. (1976) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912743 · Cited by 4,654
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Hawkins, D. (1945) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286866 · Cited by 3,887
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
Harsanyi, J. C. (1955) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257678 · Cited by 2,876
Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts
Cachon, G. P. (2003) · Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science · doi:10.1016/s0927-0507(03)11006-7 · Cited by 2,683
Cited by
Managing Disruption Risks in Supply Chains
Kleindorfer, P. R., & Saad, G. H. (2005) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2005.tb00009.x · Cited by 2,088
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2005) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2005.tb00008.x · Cited by 1,303
Pilkington, A., & Meredith, J. (2009) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2008.08.001 · Cited by 537
Metadata
- Authors
- Gan, X., Sethi, S. P., & Yan, H.
- Venue
- Production and Operations Management
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2004-06
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-149
- ISSN
- 1059-1478 (ISSN-L)
- 1937-5956
- OpenAlex
- W1977889234
- Cited by
- 302
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 13.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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