Posterior predictive checks can and should be Bayesian: Comment on Gelman and Shalizi, ‘Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics’
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Bayesian inference is conditional on the space of models assumed by the analyst. The posterior distribution indicates only which of the available parameter values are less bad than the others, without indicating whether the best available parameter values really fit the data well. A posterior predictive check is important to assess whether the posterior predictions of the least bad parameters are discrepant from the actual data in systematic ways. Gelman and Shalizi (2012a) assert that the posterior predictive check, whether done qualitatively or quantitatively, is non‐Bayesian. I suggest that the qualitative posterior predictive check might be Bayesian, and the quantitative posterior predictive check should be Bayesian. In particular, I show that the ‘Bayesian p ‐value’, from which an analyst attempts to reject a model without recourse to an alternative model, is ambiguous and inconclusive. Instead, the posterior predictive check, whether qualitative or quantitative, should be consummated with Bayesian estimation of an expanded model. The conclusion agrees with Gelman and Shalizi regarding the importance of the posterior predictive check for breaking out of an initially assumed space of models. Philosophically, the conclusion allows the liberation to be completely Bayesian instead of relying on a non‐Bayesian deus ex machina . Practically, the conclusion cautions against use of the Bayesian p ‐value in favour of direct model expansion and Bayesian evaluation.
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Citations
Cites
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Lacking control increases illusory pattern perception
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Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics
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Probabilistic models of cognition: exploring representations and inductive biases
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“A variety of other aspects of cognition and learning have been modelled as Bayesian inference (for overviews, see Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006; Jacobs & Kruschke, 2010).”
BackgroundMethodCausal inference in perception
Shams, L., & Beierholm, U. R. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.07.001 · Cited by 403 · cited 1×
“Some leading theories in cognitive science describe perception as Bayesian inference (e.g., Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Knill & Richards, 1996; Shams & Beierholm, 2010; Yuille & Kersten, 2006).”
Background
Cited by
Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results
Dienes, Z. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00781 · Cited by 1,998
“Update the prior to obtain the posterior distribution (see e.g., Kruschke, 2013b, or tools on the website for Dienes, 2008: http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/bayes_normalposte rior.swf).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBayesian estimation supersedes the t-test
Kruschke, J. K. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0029146 · Cited by 1,530
Self-citationBayesian Analysis Reporting Guidelines
Kruschke, J. K. (2021) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01177-7 · Cited by 440
Self-citationde Leeuw, J. R., & Motz, B. A. (2016) · Behavior Research Methods · doi:10.3758/s13428-015-0567-2 · Cited by 252
Scherer, R., Siddiq, F., & Teo, T. (2015) · Computers & Education · doi:10.1016/j.compedu.2015.05.005 · Cited by 220
“In particular, we relied on the Bayesian posterior predictive p value (PP p), which quantifies the discrepancies for a given test statistic T: PP p value¼ Pr [T(Drep) T(Dobs) j Dobs] (Kruschke, 2013).”
MethodStrawn, J. R., Mills, J. A., Sauley, B. A., & Welge, J. A. (2018) · Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.jaac.2018.01.015 · Cited by 98
Metadata
- Authors
- Kruschke, J. K.
- Venue
- British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-09-24
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 45-56
- ISSN
- 0007-1102 (ISSN-L)
- 2044-8317
- OpenAlex
- W2032094637
- Cited by
- 64
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 3.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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