The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
POLITICAL SELECTION IN CHINA: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF CONNECTIONS AND PERFORMANCE
Open accessAbstract
Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leaders—a pool of candidates for top political office—and examine how their chances of promotion depend on their performance in office and connections with top politicians. Our empirical analysis, based on the curriculum vitae of Chinese politicians, shows that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. This complementarity is stronger the younger provincial leaders are relative to their connected top leaders. To provide one plausible interpretation of these empirical findings, we propose a simple theory in which the complementarity arises because connections foster loyalty of junior officials to senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial leaders without risking being ousted. Our findings shed some light on why a political system known for patronage can still select competent leaders.
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Cites
中華人民共和国国家統計局 (1988) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 12,443
Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference With Clustered Errors
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2008) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.90.3.414 · Cited by 4,417
Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India*
Hsieh, C.-T., & Klenow, P. J. (2009) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1403 · Cited by 4,175
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China
Li, H., & Zhou, L.-A. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.009 · Cited by 3,668
Estimating the Value of Political Connections
Fisman, R. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.4.1095 · Cited by 2,968
The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
Xu, C. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.4.1076 · Cited by 2,623
Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space
Henderson, J. V., Storeygard, A., & Weil, D. N. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.994 · Cited by 2,596
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097524 · Cited by 2,366
Creative accounting or creative destruction? Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing
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The consequences of spatially differentiated water pollution regulation in China
Chen, Z., Kahn, M. E., Liu, Y., & Wang, Z. (2018) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2018.01.010 · Cited by 1,155
Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China
Chen, J., Pan, J., & Xu, Y. (2016) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12207 · Cited by 636
Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market*
Chen, T., & Kung, J. K.-S. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjy027 · Cited by 443
Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx016 · Cited by 336
Metadata
- Authors
- Jia, R., Kudamatsu, M., & Seim, D.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2015-04-27
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 631-668
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1881152905
- Cited by
- 589
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 154.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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