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Cited by 636China's Socioeconomic Reforms and GovernancePolitical Conflict and GovernancePolitical Influence and Corporate Strategies

Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China

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Chen, Jidong, Pan, Jennifer, Xu, Yiqing·2016·American Journal of Political Science
DOI 10.1111/ajps.12207
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Abstract

A growing body of research suggests that authoritarian regimes are responsive to societal actors, but our understanding of the sources of authoritarian responsiveness remains limited because of the challenges of measurement and causal identification. By conducting an online field experiment among 2,103 Chinese counties, we examine factors that affect officials' incentives to respond to citizens in an authoritarian context. At baseline, we find that approximately one‐third of county governments respond to citizen demands expressed online. Threats of collective action and threats of tattling to upper levels of government cause county governments to be considerably more responsive, whereas identifying as loyal, long‐standing members of the Chinese Communist Party does not increase responsiveness. Moreover, we find that threats of collective action make local officials more publicly responsive. Together, these results demonstrate that top‐down mechanisms of oversight as well as bottom‐up societal pressures are possible sources of authoritarian responsiveness.

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Crossref · 10.1111/ajps.12207

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  • These e-governance tools are not mere window-dressing; autocrats are actually responsive to citizens, especially when they fear collective action and unrest.

    “Research suggests that these tools are not mere window-dressing, but that autocrats are actually responsive to citizens, especially when they fear collective action and unrest (Chen etal., 2016).”

    From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as Chen et al., 2016

  • E-governance innovations mitigate principal-agent problems between rulers and local officials when citizens help detect corruption, which in turn is expected to alleviate grievances.

    “These innovations further mitigate principal-agent problems between rulers and local officials when citizens help to detect corruption, which in turn is expected to alleviate grievances (Chen etal., 2016; Lorentzen, 2014).”

    From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as Chen et al., 2016

  • At the local level, while channeling dissent into approved forums may occur, threats of broader protest and/or threats to reveal lower-level government failures to higher officials can lead to local responsiveness.

    “Interestingly, at the local level, while this may channel dissent into approved forums, threats of broader protest and/or threats to reveal lower-level government failures to higher officials can lead to local responsiveness (87).”

    From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [87]

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Authors
Chen, J., Pan, J., & Xu, Y.
Affiliations
  • Beijing Normal University (CN)
  • Stanford University (US)
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
ORCID
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2015-08-17
Volume
60
Issue
2
Pages
383-400
ISSN
  • 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/ajps.12207
OpenAlex
W2972768705
Cited by
636
References
110
Citations by year
2026: 54 · 2025: 91 · 2024: 97 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 82 · 2021: 65 · 2020: 55 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 53 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 2
FWCI
208.14
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • American Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
Funders
  • Department of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University
  • Princeton Research in Experimental Social Science
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Keywords
county government, local government officials, collective action, tattling, public responsiveness, authoritarian regimes, China

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