Voluntary Assurance of Voluntary CSR Disclosure
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study a firm's decisions to engage in socially responsible activities, voluntarily report on them, and purchase external assurance of the report. In our signaling model, neither firm type nor the level of activity is observed. We show that if voluntary assurance is not too expensive, the firm that engages in more socially responsible activities purchases external assurance and thus “selects” a separating equilibrium. As a result, CSR reports can be used to infer the level of activity and this causes all firms to engage in more socially responsible activity. Further, when voluntary assurance is required to support a separating equilibrium, greater monitoring by social activists increases the chosen quality of voluntary assurance—voluntary assurance and monitoring by social activists are complements, not substitutes.
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Citations
Cites
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Scrutiny, Norms, and Selective Disclosure: A Global Study of Greenwashing
Marquis, C., Toffel, M. W., & Zhou, Y. (2016) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2015.1039 · Cited by 1,680
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Cited by
Scrutiny, Norms, and Selective Disclosure: A Global Study of Greenwashing
Marquis, C., Toffel, M. W., & Zhou, Y. (2016) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2015.1039 · Cited by 1,680
“Institutions that mobilize action and the ability of actors to speak up increase the likelihood and expected costs of getting caught at selective disclosure (e.g., Bagnoli and Watts, 2014).”
Does Voluntary ESG Reporting Resolve Disagreement among ESG Rating Agencies?
Kimbrough, M. D., Wang, X. (., Wei, S., & Zhang, J. (. (2024) · European Accounting Review · doi:10.1080/09638180.2022.2088588 · Cited by 304
Taste, information, and asset prices: implications for the valuation of CSR
Friedman, H. L., & Heinle, M. S. (2016) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-016-9359-x · Cited by 237
True transparency or mere decoupling? The study of selective disclosure in sustainability reporting
Roszkowska-Menkes, M., Aluchna, M., & Kamiński, B. (2024) · Critical Perspectives on Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2023.102700 · Cited by 125
Baier, C., Göttsche, M., Hellmann, A., & Schiemann, F. (2022) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-020-04719-7 · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Bagnoli, M., & Watts, S. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-03-21
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 205-230
- ISSN
- 1058-6407 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9134
- OpenAlex
- W3125408280
- Cited by
- 68
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 5.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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