Scrutiny, Norms, and Selective Disclosure: A Global Study of Greenwashing
Open accessAbstract
Under increased pressure to report environmental impacts, some firms selectively disclose relatively benign impacts, creating an impression of transparency while masking their true performance. We theorize circumstances under which firms are less likely to engage in such selective disclosure, focusing on organizational and institutional factors that intensify scrutiny and expectations of transparency and that foster civil society mobilization. We test our hypotheses using a novel panel data set of 4,750 public companies across many industries that are headquartered in 45 countries during 2004–2007. Results show that firms that are more environmentally damaging, particularly those in countries where they are more exposed to scrutiny and global norms, are less likely to engage in selective disclosure. We discuss contributions to research on institutional theory, strategic management, and information disclosure.
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Reporting standard errors clustered by firm accommodates potential serial correlation within firms.
“We also reported standard errors clustered by firm to accommodate potential serial correlation within firms (Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016).”
From Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic (2018) · cites this paper as Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016
Greater scrutiny from stakeholders and society can produce environmental disclosures that are more accurate, more substantive, or even overly modest.
“increased scrutiny by stakeholders and society at large can lead to moreaccurate (Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016), more-substantive (Marquis and Qian, 2014), or even overly modest disclosures (Kim and Lyon, 2015).”
From Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic (2018) · cites this paper as Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016
Firms may opt to implement CSR standards in a more "symbolic" way to legitimize corporate actions, selectively disclosing positive CSR activities, without intending to materially adjust the underlying real activities.
“Firms may opt to implement CSR standards in a more “symbolic” way to legitimize corporate actions, selectively disclosing positive CSR activities, without intending to materially adjust the underlying real activities (e.g., O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer 2009; Marquis et al. 2016; Diouf and Boiral 2017).”
From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Marquis et al. 2016
Some companies mask negative information about their impact or only partially disclose this information, while others intentionally mislead using false advertisements claiming environmental responsibility.
“Some companies mask negative information about their impact or only partially disclose this information (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011;Marquis et al., 2016), while others intentionally mislead using false advertisements claiming that they are environmentally responsible when, in fact, they are not (Martínez et al., 2020;Szabo & Webster, 2021).”
From Sustainable clothing: Why conspicuous consumption and greenwashing matter (2023) · cites this paper as Marquis et al., 2016
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“By empirically examining the representativeness of firms’ environmental reporting, we also advance the nascent management literature on greenwashing (Delmas and Burbano 2011; Kim and Lyon 2011, 2015; Lyon and Maxwell 2011; Bowen 2014, Lyon and Montgomery 2015).”
InfluentialThe Means and End of Greenwash
Lyon, T. P., & Montgomery, A. W. (2015) · Organization & Environment · doi:10.1177/1086026615575332 · Cited by 1,636 · cited 1× · see citing works
“By empirically examining the representativeness of firms’ environmental reporting, we also advance the nascent management literature on greenwashing (Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Kim and Lyon, 2011, 2015; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Bowen, 2014; Lyon and Montgomery 2015).”
Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit
Lyon, T. P., & Maxwell, J. W. (2011) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00282.x · Cited by 1,569 · see citing works
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Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5 · Cited by 1,923 · see citing works
Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic
Carlos, W. C., & Lewis, B. W. (2018) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0001839217695089 · Cited by 393 · see citing works
Sneideriene, A., & Legenzova, R. (2025) · Research in International Business and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102720 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
True transparency or mere decoupling? The study of selective disclosure in sustainability reporting
Roszkowska-Menkes, M., Aluchna, M., & Kamiński, B. (2024) · Critical Perspectives on Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2023.102700 · Cited by 125 · see citing works
A Survey of Artificial General Intelligence Projects for Ethics, Risk, and Policy
Baum, S. D. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3070741 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Sustainable clothing: Why conspicuous consumption and greenwashing matter
Apaolaza, V., Policarpo, M. C., Hartmann, P., Paredes, M. R., & D'Souza, C. (2023) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.3335 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
Sustainability reporting and greenwashing: A bibliometrics assessment in G7 and non-G7 nations
Sundarasen, S., Zyznarska-Dworczak, B., & Goel, S. (2024) · Cogent Business & Management · doi:10.1080/23311975.2024.2320812 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Thao, T. T., Linh, L. T. P., & Cuong, N. Q. (2025) · Sage Open · doi:10.1177/21582440251385705 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
İpekel Kayalı, F., & Solak, E. (2026) · Journal of Consumer Policy · doi:10.1007/s10603-026-09615-7
Protecting Consumers Against „Greenwashing” under European Union Law: Lessons for Vietnam
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- Authors
- Marquis, C., Toffel, M. W., & Zhou, Y.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Marquis, Christopher
- Venue
- Organization Science
- Published
- 2016-03
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 483-504
- ISSN
- 1047-7039 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5455
- OpenAlex
- W3121311011
- Cited by
- 1,680
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2026: 533 · 2025: 320 · 2024: 236 · 2023: 185 · 2022: 114 · 2021: 76 · 2020: 67 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 40 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 12.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Organization Science (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- eCommons (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Funders
- Harvard Business School
- McGill University
- Duquesne University
- University of Toronto
- Universidade de Macau
- Peking University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Environmental Sustainability in Business
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Keywords
- greenwashing, selective disclosure, environmental disclosure, corporate transparency, environmental impact, international norms, civil society mobilization, institutional theory, public companies, environmental performance
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