Cited by 1,680Corporate Social Responsibility ReportingEnvironmental Sustainability in BusinessAuditing, Earnings Management, Governance

Scrutiny, Norms, and Selective Disclosure: A Global Study of Greenwashing

Open access
Marquis, Christopher, Toffel, Michael W., Zhou, Yanhua·2016·Organization Science

Abstract

Under increased pressure to report environmental impacts, some firms selectively disclose relatively benign impacts, creating an impression of transparency while masking their true performance. We theorize circumstances under which firms are less likely to engage in such selective disclosure, focusing on organizational and institutional factors that intensify scrutiny and expectations of transparency and that foster civil society mobilization. We test our hypotheses using a novel panel data set of 4,750 public companies across many industries that are headquartered in 45 countries during 2004–2007. Results show that firms that are more environmentally damaging, particularly those in countries where they are more exposed to scrutiny and global norms, are less likely to engage in selective disclosure. We discuss contributions to research on institutional theory, strategic management, and information disclosure.

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Crossref · 10.1287/orsc.2015.1039

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7 of 7 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Reporting standard errors clustered by firm accommodates potential serial correlation within firms.

    “We also reported standard errors clustered by firm to accommodate potential serial correlation within firms (Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016).”

    From Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic (2018) · cites this paper as Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016

  • Greater scrutiny from stakeholders and society can produce environmental disclosures that are more accurate, more substantive, or even overly modest.

    “increased scrutiny by stakeholders and society at large can lead to moreaccurate (Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016), more-substantive (Marquis and Qian, 2014), or even overly modest disclosures (Kim and Lyon, 2015).”

    From Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic (2018) · cites this paper as Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016

  • Firms may opt to implement CSR standards in a more "symbolic" way to legitimize corporate actions, selectively disclosing positive CSR activities, without intending to materially adjust the underlying real activities.

    “Firms may opt to implement CSR standards in a more “symbolic” way to legitimize corporate actions, selectively disclosing positive CSR activities, without intending to materially adjust the underlying real activities (e.g., O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer 2009; Marquis et al. 2016; Diouf and Boiral 2017).”
  • Some companies mask negative information about their impact or only partially disclose this information, while others intentionally mislead using false advertisements claiming environmental responsibility.

    “Some companies mask negative information about their impact or only partially disclose this information (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011;Marquis et al., 2016), while others intentionally mislead using false advertisements claiming that they are environmentally responsible when, in fact, they are not (Martínez et al., 2020;Szabo & Webster, 2021).”

    From Sustainable clothing: Why conspicuous consumption and greenwashing matter (2023) · cites this paper as Marquis et al., 2016

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Authors
Marquis, C., Toffel, M. W., & Zhou, Y.
Affiliations
  • Cornell University (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Marquis, Christopher
Venue
Organization Science
Published
2016-03
Volume
27
Issue
2
Pages
483-504
ISSN
  • 1047-7039 (ISSN-L)
  • 1526-5455
OpenAlex
W3121311011
Cited by
1,680
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 533 · 2025: 320 · 2024: 236 · 2023: 185 · 2022: 114 · 2021: 76 · 2020: 67 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 40 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 1
FWCI
12.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Organization Science (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • eCommons (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
  • Harvard Business School
  • McGill University
  • Duquesne University
  • University of Toronto
  • Universidade de Macau
  • Peking University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Environmental Sustainability in Business
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Keywords
greenwashing, selective disclosure, environmental disclosure, corporate transparency, environmental impact, international norms, civil society mobilization, institutional theory, public companies, environmental performance

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