The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Outsourcing Mutual Fund Management: Firm Boundaries, Incentives, and Performance
Open accessAbstract
We investigate the effects of managerial outsourcing on the performance and incentives of mutual funds. Fund families outsource the management of a large fraction of their funds to advisory firms. These funds underperform those run internally by about 52 basis points per year. After instrumenting for a fund's outsourcing status, the estimated underperformance is three times larger. We hypothesize that contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it difficult to extract performance from an outsourced relationship. Consistent with this view, outsourced funds face higher powered incentives; they are more likely to be closed after poor performance and excessive risk‐taking.
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Cites
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CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*
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Specification Tests in Econometrics
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On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance
Carhart, M. M. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x · Cited by 17,283
Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913610 · Cited by 16,936
Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency
JEGADEESH, N., & TITMAN, S. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04702.x · Cited by 11,584
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
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Two-stage residual inclusion estimation: Addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling
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Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization
Chen, J., Hong, H., Huang, M., & Kubik, J. D. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052277 · Cited by 1,430
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Cited by
Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization
Chen, J., Hong, H., Huang, M., & Kubik, J. D. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052277 · Cited by 1,430
Self-citationMutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha
GUERCIO, D. D., & REUTER, J. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12048 · Cited by 389
Is Unbiased Financial Advice to Retail Investors Sufficient? Answers from a Large Field Study
Bhattacharya, U., Hackethal, A., Kaesler, S., Loos, B., & Meyer, S. (2012) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr127 · Cited by 383
Metadata
- Authors
- CHEN, J., HONG, H., JIANG, W., & KUBIK, J. D.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-03-07
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 523-558
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3123046671
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 27.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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