The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang
Abstract
Debt maturity influences debt overhang, the reduced incentive for highly levered borrowers to make real investments because some value accrues to debt. Reducing maturity can increase or decrease overhang even when shorter term debt's value depends less on firm value. Future overhang is more volatile for shorter term debt, making future investment incentives volatile and influencing immediate investment incentives. With immediate investment, shorter term debt typically imposes lower overhang; longer term debt can impose less if asset volatility is higher in bad times. For future investments, reduced correlation between assets‐in‐place and investment opportunities increases the shorter term debt overhang.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Merton, R. C. (1974) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x · Cited by 10,581
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Self-citationTesting Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2002) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/15.1.1 · Cited by 3,392
Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure
LELAND, H. E. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb02452.x · Cited by 2,729
Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking
Diamond, D. W., & Rajan, R. G. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/319552 · Cited by 2,002
Self-citationOptimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads
LELAND, H. E., & TOFT, K. B. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb02714.x · Cited by 1,958
The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt
BARCLAY, M. J., & SMITH, C. W. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04797.x · Cited by 1,850
Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk
Diamond, D. W. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937924 · Cited by 1,801
Self-citationDynamic Capital Structure Choice: Theory and Tests
FISCHER, E. O., HEINKEL, R., & ZECHNER, J. (1989) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02402.x · Cited by 1,571
Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure
Leland, H. E. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00051 · Cited by 1,496
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements
Calomiris, C. W., & Kahn, C. M. (1991) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d8th8x53 · Cited by 1,470
Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice
FLANNERY, M. J. (1986) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04489.x · Cited by 1,200
The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure
Stohs, M. H., & Mauer, D. C. (1996) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/209692 · Cited by 938
Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527003 · Cited by 827
The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues
GUEDES, J., & OPLER, T. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05227.x · Cited by 769
Seniority and maturity of debt contracts
Diamond, D. W. (1993) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(93)90011-y · Cited by 642
Self-citationHE, Z., & XIONG, W. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01721.x · Cited by 610
Self-citationA Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law*
GERTNER, R., & SCHARFSTEIN, D. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04615.x · Cited by 604
Debt Maturity and the Effects of Growth Opportunities and Liquidity Risk on Leverage
Johnson, S. A. (2003) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/16.1.0209 · Cited by 547
BRUNNERMEIER, M. K., & OEHMKE, M. (2013) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12005 · Cited by 414
A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure
Titman, S., & Tsyplakov, S. (2007) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfm017 · Cited by 372
Debt maturity and the deadweight cost of leverage: Optimally financing banking firms
Flannery, M. J. (1991) · American Economic Review · Cited by 366
He, Z., & Xiong, W. (2012) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs004 · Cited by 333
Self-citationOptimal Priority Structure, Capital Structure, and Investment
Hackbarth, D., & Mauer, D. C. (2012) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr129 · Cited by 280
Banks, short-term debt and financial crises: theory, policy implications and applications
Diamond, D. W., & Rajan, R. G. (2001) · Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy · doi:10.1016/s0167-2231(01)00039-2 · Cited by 199
Self-citationFUTURE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND THE VALUE OF THE CALL PROVISION ON A BOND
Bodie, Z., & Taggart, R. A. (1978) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02056.x · Cited by 180
How big is the debt overhang problem?
Moyen, N. (2006) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2005.10.008 · Cited by 135
A model of dynamic compensation and capital structure☆
He, Z. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.01.005 · Cited by 135
Self-citationDebt and managerial rents in a real-options model of the firm
Lambrecht, B. M., & Myers, S. C. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.007 · Cited by 112
Bond Prices, Yield Spreads, and Optimal Capital Structure with Default Risk
Leland, H. E. (2019) · Finance · doi:10.3917/e.fina.403.0045 · Cited by 95
Cited by
The financing of local government in China: Stimulus loan wanes and shadow banking waxes
Chen, Z., He, Z., & Liu, C. (2020) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.07.009 · Cited by 687
Self-citationADMATI, A. R., DEMARZO, P. M., HELLWIG, M. F., & PFLEIDERER, P. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12588 · Cited by 286
Bank liquidity provision across the firm size distribution
Chodorow-Reich, G., Darmouni, O., Luck, S., & Plosser, M. (2022) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.035 · Cited by 257
Ayaz, M., Mohamed Zabri, S., & Ahmad, K. (2021) · Managerial Finance · doi:10.1108/mf-11-2019-0586 · Cited by 52
Metadata
- Authors
- DIAMOND, D. W., & HE, Z.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-03-17
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 719-762
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2595255354
- Cited by
- 304
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 42.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.