The DOI matches its Crossref record; 75 of the 75 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Creditor Rights Increase Employment Risk? Evidence from Loan Covenants
Abstract
Using a regression discontinuity design, we provide evidence that there are sharp and substantial employment cuts following loan covenant violations, when creditors gain rights to accelerate, restructure, or terminate a loan. The cuts are larger at firms with higher financing frictions and with weaker employee bargaining power, and during industry and macroeconomic downturns, when employees have fewer job opportunities. Union elections that create new labor bargaining units lead to higher loan spreads, consistent with creditors requiring compensation when employees gain bargaining power. Overall, binding financial contracts have a large impact on employees and are an amplification mechanism of economic downturns.
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Cited by
Anatomy of Corporate Borrowing Constraints*
Lian, C., & Ma, Y. (2020) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa030 · Cited by 373
Institutional investors' horizons and corporate employment decisions
Ghaly, M., Dang, V. A., & Stathopoulos, K. (2020) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101634 · Cited by 253
Metadata
- Authors
- FALATO, A., & LIANG, N.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-11-10
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2545-2590
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W1540878127
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 75
- FWCI
- 75.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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