The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
State versus Private Ownership
Abstract
Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism, explaining the 'dynamic vitality' of free enterprise. The great economists of the 1930s and 1940s failed to see the dangers of socialism in part because they focused on the role of prices under socialism and capitalism and ignored the enormous importance of ownership as the source of capitalist incentives to innovate. Moreover, the concern that private firms fail to address 'social goals' can be addressed through government contracting and regulation, without resorting to government ownership. The case for private provision only becomes stronger when competition between suppliers, reputational mechanisms, the possibility of provision by private not-for-profit firms, as well as political patronage and corruption, are brought into play.
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“Several literature contributions explain that the owners of a firm affect its CG and strategic orientation (Shleifer, 1998; Connelly et al., 2010), and environmental strategy (Tan, 2002), and 'shape the underlying motivations of the firms accordingly which then might in fluence the implementation of sustainability ' (Ali Yawar and Kuula, 2021, p. 2).”
From Effective stakeholder governance in circular economy: Insights from Italian companies (2024) · cites this paper as Shleifer, 1998
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Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
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The Struggle to Govern the Commons
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1091015 · Cited by 4,209
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.08.005 · Cited by 1,204
Self-citationInstitutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms
CULL, R., & XU, L. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.010 · Cited by 1,023
Corporate ownership and managerial turnover in China and Eastern Europe: A comparative meta-analysis
Iwasaki, I., Ma, X., & Mizobata, S. (2020) · Journal of Economics and Business · doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2020.105928 · Cited by 51
Effective stakeholder governance in circular economy: Insights from Italian companies
Minoja, M., & Romano, G. (2024) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.143584 · Cited by 35
Metadata
- Authors
- Shleifer, A.
- Affiliations
- Professor of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1998-11-01
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 133-150
- ISSN
- 0895-3309
- Cited by
- 1,266
- References
- 1
- Language
- en
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