Cited by 30Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceMental Health and PsychiatryEmbodied and Extended Cognition

Four-dimensional graded consciousness

Open access
Jonkisz, Jakub, Wierzchoń, Michał, Binder, Marek·2017·Frontiers in Psychology

Abstract

Both the multidimensional phenomenon and the polysemous notion of consciousness continue to prove resistant to consistent measurement and unambiguous definition. This is hardly surprising, given that there is no agreement even as regards the most fundamental issues they involve. One of the basic disagreements present in the continuing debate about consciousness pertains to its gradational nature. The general aim of this article is to show how consciousness might be graded and multidimensional at the same time. We therefore focus on the question of what it is, exactly, that is or could be graded in cases of consciousness, and how we can measure it. Ultimately, four different gradable aspects of consciousness will be described: quality, abstractness, complexity and usefulness, which belong to four different dimensions, these being understood, respectively, as phenomenal, semantic, physiological and functional. Consequently, consciousness may be said to vary with respect to phenomenal quality, semantic abstraction, physiological complexity and functional usefulness. It is hoped that such a four-dimensional approach will help to clarify and justify claims about the hierarchical nature of consciousness. The approach also proves explanatorily advantageous, as it enables us not only to draw attention to certain new and important differences in respect of subjective measures of awareness and to justify how a given creature may be ranked higher in one dimension of consciousness and lower in terms of another, but also allows for innovative explanations of a variety of well-known phenomena (amongst these, the interpretations of blindsight and locked-in syndrome will be briefly outlined here). Moreover, a 4D framework makes possible many predictions and hypotheses that may be experimentally tested. (We point out a few such possibilities pertaining to interdimensional dependencies).

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00420

Cites

117 of 118 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • A weak point of the four-dimensional model of Jonkisz et al. (2017) remains in the step from the four outlined dimensions being considered criteria for defining consciousness to becoming dimensions of consciousness itself.

    “On the other hand, a weak point remains in the step from the four outlined dimensions being considered criteria for defining consciousness ( Jonkisz, 2012 ) to becoming dimensions of consciousness itself ( Jonkisz et al., 2017 ).”

    From What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review (2024) · cites this paper as Jonkisz et al., 2017

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Metzinger T. (ed.) (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Jonkisz, J., Wierzchoń, M., & Binder, M.
Affiliations
  • University of Bielsko-Biała (PL)
  • Jagiellonian University (PL)
Corresponding author
Jonkisz, Jakub
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2017-03-21
Volume
8
Pages
420-420
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2594987642
Cited by
30
References
117
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 6
FWCI
4.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Jagiellonian University Repository (Jagiellonian University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Homo Politicus (Academy of Humanities and Economics in Lodz) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
Narodowe Centrum Nauki (UMO-2013/11/B/HS1/03968)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
multidimensional consciousness, phenomenal qualities, semantic abstraction, physiological complexity, subjective awareness, blindsight, locked-in syndrome, consciousness assessment

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review