The DOI matches its Crossref record; 100 of the 110 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 5 of the 32 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review
Open accessAbstract
A recent development in the psychological and neuroscientific study of consciousness has been the tendency to conceptualize consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon. This narrative review elucidates the notion of dimensionality of consciousness and outlines the key concepts and disagreements on this topic through the viewpoints of several theoretical proposals. The reviewed literature is critically evaluated, and the main issues to be resolved by future theoretical and empirical work are identified: the problems of dimension selection and dimension aggregation, as well as some ethical considerations. This narrative review is seemingly the first to comprehensively overview this specific aspect of consciousness science.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This narrative review surveys major ways consciousness has been described as multidimensional, focusing on human consciousness in cognitive science and philosophy. Its main conclusion is that the field still lacks a clear way to identify which dimensions genuinely belong to consciousness and how, if at all, they should be aggregated into overall comparisons.
## Key findings
- The review distinguishes dimensional description of consciousness from the stronger claim that consciousness itself has a dimensional structure; most models discussed do not clearly commit to one or the other.
- The paper identifies a recurring problem across models: there is no clear criterion for selecting true dimensions of consciousness versus biological confounds or unrelated psychological constructs.
- In the bidimensional model, the paper discusses a level dimension and a content/awareness dimension; the Ictal Consciousness Inventory’s content subscale was explained by a single factor with little cross-loading from level, but the author argues that the content dimension likely remains multidimensional in itself.
- The review notes that the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness posits 4 dimensions—level/state, content/form, phenomenal features, and global cognitive access—each tied to a specific neural mechanism.
## Methods
- Narrative review of theoretical and empirical work on the dimensionality of human consciousness.
- Scope was limited to models from cognitive science and philosophy; it excluded artificial systems, non-human animals, religion/spirituality, and quantum theories.
- The review organizes the literature into sections on general issues, several theoretical models, and empirical approaches, then critically compares their assumptions and limitations.
## Limitations
- The paper explicitly states that it is a narrative review, and it does not claim a systematic search or meta-analysis; it also says the review is limited in scope to human consciousness and to models that clearly endorse dimensionality.
- The author notes that few research papers directly study the dimensions of consciousness, and that many proposals remain intangible and too far from current psychological and neuroscientific methods to be easily tested.
- A limitation evident in the text is that many models are underspecified about how to distinguish real dimensions of consciousness from confounds, and about how multiple dimensions should be aggregated into an overall ordering.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
3 Valid · 3 Not valid · 20 Not checked · 38 Own results and interpretations
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“On the other hand, a weak point remains in the step from the four outlined dimensions being considered criteria for defining consciousness ( Jonkisz, 2012 ) to becoming dimensions of consciousness itself ( Jonkisz et al., 2017 ).”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Jonkisz, 2012
- Supportedcites Jonkisz et al., 2017 source
The Four Dimensions of Consciousness section explicitly proposes phenomenological, semantic, physiological, and functional dimensions of consciousness. The judgment that this step is a 'weak point' is the citing authors' critique, not a claim attributed to Jonkisz et al. (2017). (LLM, conf=0.92)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Evidence on the exact nature of the relationship between intelligence and complexity measures is currently mixed ( Saxe et al., 2018 ; Dreszer et al., 2020 ; Wang, 2021 ; Thiele et al., 2023 ).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Saxe et al., 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Conclusion says further work is needed to establish the precise nature of the relationship between brain entropy and intelligence. But the Results and Discussion report a consistent positive association in this study; the paper does not establish that evidence across complexity measures is mixed. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Supportedcites Dreszer et al., 2020 source
The Introduction says existing evidence on intelligence and resting-state EEG complexity has yielded ambiguous outcomes: one study found greater complexity with higher intelligence, while another did not confirm it. The Discussion also reports relationships that differ by timescale and says more studies are needed to clarify them. (LLM, conf=0.94)
- Partly supportedcites Wang, 2021 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results and Discussion report that higher fluid intelligence was associated with lower resting-state brain entropy in parts of the executive-control and default-mode networks. This supplies one finding about the intelligence–complexity relationship, but the paper does not establish that evidence across studies is mixed. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This variable cannot be seen as identical to the intuitive or clinical conception of a level of consciousness, as will be seen in the overview of the theory below.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, for the purposes of our discussion about dimensions of consciousness, the most pivotal problem rests in the fact that Φ is not associated with any specific functional or phenomenal features of consciousness.”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“While the recent interest in complexity measures seems to be connected mostly with IIT, these results can be interpreted outside of the theory’s context, as will be demonstrated in the sections below (3.3, 3.5, and 4).”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
14 more claims
Create a free account to see all 64 claims and to verify the 27 references still open.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 16
- Probably not a substantial claim. 39
Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
The minimally conscious state: Definition and diagnostic criteria
Giacino, J. T., Ashwal, S., Childs, N., Cranford, R., Jennett, B., Katz, D. I., Kelly, J. P., Rosenberg, J. H., Whyte, J., Zafonte, R. D., et al. (2002) · Neurology · doi:10.1212/wnl.58.3.349 · Cited by 2,422 · cited 1×
“Patients can be placed along a scale where normal, alert waking consciousness is at the top, deep coma at the bottom, and various intermediate conditions, such as the minimally conscious state, in between (Giacino et al., 2002).”
BackgroundAn information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958 · cited 1×
“Any interested readers are therefore referred to the pivotal texts establishing the theory (Tononi, 2004; Oizumi et al., 2014; Albantakis et al., 2023).”
BackgroundIntegrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727
Vagueness and grammar: the semantics of relative and absolute gradable adjectives
Kennedy, C. (2007) · Linguistics and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10988-006-9008-0 · Cited by 1,315 · cited 1×
“While their comparative forms (“is taller than”), given the correct context, are relatively unproblematic, the positive form (“is tall”) often introduces vagueness, resulting in statements with unclear truth values (Kennedy, 2007).”
BackgroundContemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests, and Issues
Gallo, J. L. (2013) · Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology · doi:10.1093/arclin/act011 · Cited by 1,254
A theoretically based index of consciousness independent of sensory processing and behavior
Casali, A. G., Gosseries, O., Rosanova, M., Boly, M., Sarasso, S., Casali, K. R., Casarotto, S., Bruno, M.-A., Laureys, S., Tononi, G., et al. (2013) · Science Translational Medicine · doi:10.1126/scitranslmed.3006294 · Cited by 1,246
From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588 · Cited by 1,128 · cited 1×
“Any interested readers are therefore referred to the pivotal texts establishing the theory (Tononi, 2004; Oizumi et al., 2014; Albantakis et al., 2023).”
BackgroundTo See or Not to See: Prestimulus α Phase Predicts Visual Awareness
Mathewson, K. E., Gratton, G., Fabiani, M., Beck, D. M., & Ro, T. (2009) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3963-08.2009 · Cited by 1,007 · cited 1×
“This is evidenced by the phenomenon of “phase preference” (Northoff and Huang, 2017), where the pre-stimulus phase of brain oscillations affects whether a near-threshold percept reaches consciousness (Mathewson et al., 2009; Glim et al., 2020).”
BackgroundActive interoceptive inference and the emotional brain
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0007 · Cited by 945 · cited 1×
“Lastly, the functional dimension of consciousness is not assigned to any experimental paradigm in psychology or neuroscience but is instead related to the “Bayesian brain” hypothesis (Friston, 2012; Seth and Friston, 2016).”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Schneider, 2012, The Cattell-horn-Carroll model of intelligence, 99
Cited by
Preliminaries to artificial consciousness: A multidimensional heuristic approach
Evers, K., Farisco, M., Chatila, R., Earp, B. D., Freire, I. T., Hamker, F. H., Németh, E., Verschure, P. F. M. J., & Khamassi, M. (2025) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2025.01.002 · Cited by 27
Network approach in psychology
Farahani, H., Kovač, N., Simeunović, M., Watson, P., & Zhang, J. (2025) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-30248-0.00016-4
Bochdansky, T. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-71737-0_1
Metadata
- Authors
- Páleník, J.
- Affiliations
- Masaryk University (CZ)
- Corresponding author
- Páleník, Julie
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2024-06-20
- Volume
- 15
- Pages
- 1430262-1430262
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC11222411
- OpenAlex
- W4399868278
- Cited by
- 4
- References
- 110
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2
- FWCI
- 0.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Veřejné služby Informačního systému (Masarykiana Brunensis Universitas) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- European Commission (LX22 NPO5107)
- Ministerstvo Školství, Mládeže a Tělovýchovy (LX22NPO5107)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- consciousness, multidimensional consciousness, dimension selection
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430262
- The paper
- Páleník, J. (2024). What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430262
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.