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Performance‐Related Pay and the Crowding Out of Motivation in the Public Sector: A Randomized Field Experiment

Bellé, Nicola · 2015 · Public Administration Review
Cited by 175

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This article advances our understanding of the effects of monetary rewards on public employee performance and of the contingencies that may moderate these effects. In a randomized control‐group experiment with nurses working at a local health authority in Italy, performance‐related pay (PRP) had a larger effect on task performance when the rewards were kept secret than when they were disclosed. The negative interaction between PRP and visibility was stronger among participants who were exposed to direct contact with a beneficiary of their efforts, which heightened their perception of making a positive difference in other people's lives. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions that monetary incentives for activities with a prosocial impact may crowd out employee image motivation. There were no crowding‐out effects when a symbolic reward was substituted for the monetary incentive.

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Crossref · 10.1111/puar.12313

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Metadata

Authors
Bellé, N.
Venue
Public Administration Review
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2015-01-13
Volume
75
Issue
2
Pages
230-241
ISSN
  • 0033-3352 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6210
OpenAlex
W2075547090
Cited by
175
References
12
FWCI
43.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.