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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet; none of the 59 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Understanding the regulator–regulatee relationship for developing safety culture

Open access

Abstract

Regulatory authorities in safety‐critical industries typically seek to influence the safety culture of the organizations they oversee. However, we know little about how regulatory authorities achieve this influence (e.g., what roles are adopted, relationship characteristics) and, more generally, about how external actors shape an organization's safety culture. Using a qualitative design in the nuclear industry, we developed our conceptual and empirical understanding of the roles through which a regulator influences the safety culture of their regulated organizations and what characteristics within the regulator–regulatee relationship facilitate positive safety culture developments. Data were collected through interviews with inspectors from a nuclear regulator and employees of regulated nuclear organizations, and from an inspection of regulatory documents. The findings identified that the regulator was perceived to hold three complementary roles for safety culture development: being an enforcer, working as a partner (providing opportunities for licenseholders to improve beyond compliance), and acting as an advisor to regulated organizations. Analysis also showed that effective relationships in these roles, and which were central to influencing safety culture, were perceived to be characterized by professionalism, transparency, and balance between formal enforcement and informal exchange. Theoretical implications to advance conceptualizations of safety culture as well as practical implications for risk regulators are discussed.

Checked 2026-11-15 · 1 reference not checked yet

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This qualitative nuclear-industry study finds that regulators influence regulatee safety culture through three perceived roles—enforcer, partner, and advisor/consultant—supported by relationships marked by professionalism, transparency, and balance between formal enforcement and informal exchange. It also identifies self-development facilitation and implicit influence as mechanisms, with regulator roles serving content, credibility, and will.

Key findings

  • The regulator was perceived to hold three complementary roles for safety culture development: enforcer, partner/collaborator, and consultant/advisor. Dutyholders expected and accepted a strong enforcement role, while regulator inspectors noted that influence powers were used more often than formal enforcement.
  • Effective regulator–regulatee relationships were characterized by three themes: balance between formal enforcement and informal exchange, professionalism, and transparency. Dutyholders reported never losing sight of the regulator’s enforcement powers, and regulators emphasized independence and appropriate, proportionate action.
  • The roles were linked to three higher-order purposes: providing content/knowledge, stimulating will/motivation, and awarding credibility. These mapped onto Vogus et al.’s safety culture development processes of enablement, enactment, and elaboration.
  • Mechanisms facilitating safety culture development were facilitating dutyholder self-development and implicit regulation, where safety culture was often addressed indirectly through other areas such as leadership. Some dutyholders wanted a more formal, explicit regulatory approach, such as a license condition.

Methods

  • Qualitative iterative design in the nuclear industry. Data included 12 semi-structured interviews with employees from five nuclear dutyholder organizations, three follow-up interviews with senior nuclear inspectors, 12 supplementary interviews with nuclear regulator inspectors, and analysis of two regulator documents. Interviews were conducted July 2020–January 2021, averaged 60 min, and were transcribed verbatim.
  • Thematic analysis followed Braun and Clarke’s six steps. Phase 1 was predominantly inductive; phases 2 and 3 used a more deductive approach with some inductive review. Semantic and latent coding were used, with triangulation, cross-coding, member checking, and NVivo for an audit trail.

Limitations

  • Stated: the study is primarily interview-based and reflects individuals’ experiences at a given point in time; it did not include more objective data on regulator influence; question wording such as “collaboration” may have primed participants toward informal interactions; participants knew the regulator would receive a summary, which may have influenced responses. Future research is suggested in other industries and with quantitative or longitudinal designs.
  • Evident from the text: the findings come from a small qualitative sample in one heavily regulated nuclear context and are based on perceptions, limiting generalizability and causal inference.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/risa.14214

Cites

45 of 46 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Figures

FIGURE 1 Analysis process.
FIGURE 1 Analysis process.CC-BY-NC-ND · From the PDF
FIGURE 2 Regulator's roles for safety culture.
FIGURE 2 Regulator's roles for safety culture.CC-BY-NC-ND · From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Self-check

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Citations

Cites

Show all 46 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. 10.1177/001872081986887 · doi:10.1177/001872081986887
  2. Bradley C. S.(2017).Regulator safety (oversight) culture: How a regulator's culture influences safety outcomes in high hazard industries[Doctoral dissertation Fielding Graduate University]. ProQuest Dissertation Publishing. Regulator safety (oversight) culture: How a regulator's culture influences safety outcomes in high hazard industries—ProQuest.
  3. 10.1037/1076‐8998.11.4.315 · DOI · Paper page
  4. CNSC. (2019).The Canadian Nuclear regulator's perspective on safety culture[conference presentation abstract].International Conference on Effective Nuclear and Radiation Regulatory Systems The Hague Netherlands.
  5. Grote G., 2013, Trapping Safety into Rules, 225
  6. Le Coze J.‐C., 2013, Trapping safety into rules, 109
  7. 10.1177/160940691773384 · doi:10.1177/160940691773384
  8. Turner B., 1978, Man‐made disasters

Metadata

Authors
Willis, S., Holman, D., Clarke, S., & Hartwig, A.
Affiliations
University of Manchester (GB)
Corresponding author
Willis, Sara
Venue
Risk Analysis
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2023-09-05
Volume
44
Issue
4
Pages
972-990
ISSN
  • 0272-4332 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-6924
OpenAlex
W4386466447
Cited by
9
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 5
FWCI
2.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Risk Analysis (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Occupational Health and Safety Research
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Risk Perception and Management
Keywords
safety culture, regulatory influence, nuclear industry, safety regulations, regulatory function, advisory role, compliance, professionalism, transparency, risk regulation
MeSH terms
Humans, Safety Management

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How to cite

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Understanding the regulator–regulatee relationship for developing safety culture. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/risa.14214
The paper
Willis, S., Holman, D., Clarke, S., & Hartwig, A. (2024). Understanding the regulator–regulatee relationship for developing safety culture. Risk Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.14214

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.