Tuning Your Priors to the World
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The idea that perceptual and cognitive systems must incorporate knowledge about the structure of the environment has become a central dogma of cognitive theory. In a Bayesian context, this idea is often realized in terms of “tuning the prior”—widely assumed to mean adjusting prior probabilities so that they match the frequencies of events in the world. This kind of “ecological” tuning has often been held up as an ideal of inference, in fact defining an “ideal observer.” But widespread as this viewpoint is, it directly contradicts Bayesian philosophy of probability, which views probabilities as degrees of belief rather than relative frequencies, and explicitly denies that they are objective characteristics of the world. Moreover, tuning the prior to observed environmental frequencies is subject to overfitting, meaning in this context overtuning to the environment, which leads (ironically) to poor performance in future encounters with the same environment. Whenever there is uncertainty about the environment—which there almost always is—an agent's prior should be biased away from ecological relative frequencies and toward simpler and more entropic priors.
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Citations
Cites
Probability Theory: The Logic of Science
Jaynes, E. T. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790423 · Cited by 4,045
Neural Networks and the Bias/Variance Dilemma
Geman, S., Bienenstock, E., & Doursat, R. (1992) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco.1992.4.1.1 · Cited by 3,578 · cited 1×
“Jaynes (2003) directly addresses the question of why Gaussian priors so often out-perform more detailed priors based on frequency tabulations.”
BackgroundPerception and the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments
Brunswik, E. (1956) · doi:10.1525/9780520350519 · Cited by 2,974
All of Statistics: A Concise Course in Statistical Inference
Wasserman, L. (2004) · Springer Texts in Statistics · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-21736-9 · Cited by 1,090
Cox, R. (2001) · doi:10.56021/9780801869822 · Cited by 462
Ecological statistics of Gestalt laws for the perceptual organization of contours
Elder, J. H., & Goldberg, R. M. (2002) · Journal of Vision · doi:10.1167/2.4.5 · Cited by 333 · cited 1×
“One can of course substitute various approximations and proxies, such as tabulations of subjective evaluations of them (e.g., Elder & Goldberg, 2002; Geisler, Perry, Super, & Gallogly, 2001), though this necessarily introduces an element of circularity (because a supposedly objective estimation…”
BackgroundJaynes, E. T. (1973) · Foundations of Physics · doi:10.1007/bf00709116 · Cited by 297 · cited 2×
“…probabilities do not have to derive solely from prior observations; they can and should reflect all prior knowledge, including knowledge not easily expressed in terms of frequencies—for example , symmetries of the problem (Jaynes, 1973) or a preference for simple hypotheses (Jeffreys, 1939/1961).”
BackgroundNatural selection and veridical perceptions
Mark, J. T., Marion, B. B., & Hoffman, D. D. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.020 · Cited by 97 · cited 1×
“From an evolutionary point of view, the best prior is one that maximizes adaptive fitness, not one that happens to agree with a relative frequencies in the environment (cf. Hoffman , 2009; Mark et al., 2010).”
Background
Cited by
Precise minds in uncertain worlds: Predictive coding in autism.
Van de Cruys, S., Evers, K., Van der Hallen, R., Van Eylen, L., Boets, B., de-Wit, L., & Wagemans, J. (2014) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0037665 · Cited by 885
Thinking through other minds: A variational approach to cognition and culture
Veissière, S. P. L., Constant, A., Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19001213 · Cited by 348
The Interface Theory of Perception
Hoffman, D. D., Singh, M., & Prakash, C. (2015) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0890-8 · Cited by 329
The feeling of grip: novelty, error dynamics, and the predictive brain
Kiverstein, J., Miller, M., & Rietveld, E. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1583-9 · Cited by 143
Hoffman, D. D., & Prakash, C. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00577 · Cited by 103
Metadata
- Authors
- Feldman, J.
- Venue
- Topics in Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-01
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 13-34
- ISSN
- 1756-8757 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-8765
- OpenAlex
- W2132049331
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 6.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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