Cited by 511Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationMathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology ModelsGame Theory and Applications

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Game theory and physics

Hauert, Christoph, Szabó, György·2005·American Journal of Physics

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory is designed to capture the essentials of the characteristic interactions among individuals. Its most prominent application is the quest for the origins and evolution of cooperation. The effects of population structures on the performance of behavioral strategies became apparent only in recent years and marks the advent of an intriguing link between apparently unrelated disciplines. Evolutionary game theory in structured populations reveals critical phase transitions that fall into the universality class of directed percolation on square lattices and mean-field-type transitions on regular small world networks and random regular graphs. We employ the prisoner’s dilemma to discuss new insights gained in behavioral ecology using methods from physics.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1119/1.1848514

Cites

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Moderate noise levels in social interactions are commonly observed in the real world.

    “this condition is the presence of moderate noise levels in social interactions, which are commonly observed in the real world 82.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [82]

Citations

Cites

No references could be resolved yet.

Research works printed but not linked: 43

  1. 2003, Escape from prisoner’s dilemma in RNA phage Φ6, Am. Nat., 161, 497, 10.1086/367880 · DOI
  2. 1973, The logic of animal conflict, Nature (London), 246, 15, 10.1038/246015a0 · DOI
  3. 1971, The evolution of reciprocal altruism, Q. Rev. Biol., 46, 35, 10.1086/406755 · DOI · Paper page
  4. 1998, Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring, Nature (London), 393, 573, 10.1038/31225 · DOI · Paper page
  5. 2000, Cooperation through image scoring in humans, Science, 288, 850, 10.1126/science.288.5467.850 · DOI · Paper page
  6. 2002, Volunteering as red queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games, Science, 296, 1129, 10.1126/science.1070582 · DOI
  7. 2002, Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games, Phys. Rev. Lett., 89, 118101, 10.1103/PhysRevLett.89.118101 · DOI
  8. 2003, Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game, Nature (London), 425, 390, 10.1038/nature01986 · DOI
  9. 1992, Evolutionary games and spatial chaos, Nature (London), 359, 826, 10.1038/359826a0 · DOI
  10. 1994, Collective phenomena in spatially extended evolutionary games, J. Theor. Biol., 169, 65, 10.1006/jtbi.1994.1130 · DOI
  11. 1994, Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games, Physica D, 75, 292, 10.1016/0167-2789(94)90289-5 · DOI
  12. 1997, The evolution of cooperation in a lattice-structured population, J. Theor. Biol., 184, 65, 10.1006/jtbi.1996.0243 · DOI
  13. 1998, Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice, Phys. Rev. E, 58, 69, 10.1103/PhysRevE.58.69 · DOI
  14. 1999, Evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations, J. Theor. Biol., 200, 405, 10.1006/jtbi.1999.1000 · DOI
  15. 1925, Beitrag zur Theorie des Ferromagnetismus, Z. Phys., 31, 253, 10.1007/BF02980577 · DOI · Paper page
  16. 1950, The bargaining problem, Econometrica, 18, 155, 10.2307/1907266 · DOI
  17. 1963, Time-dependent statistics of the Ising model, J. Math. Phys., 4, 294, 10.1063/1.1703954 · DOI
  18. 2000, Non-equilibrium critical phenomena and phase transitions into absorbing states, Adv. Phys., 49, 815, 10.1080/00018730050198152 · DOI
  19. 1963, The evolution of altruistic behaviour, Am. Nat., 97, 354, 10.1086/497114 · DOI
  20. 1957, Percolation processes, I. Crystals and mazes, Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc., 53, 629, 10.1017/S0305004100032680 · DOI
  21. 1974, Contact interactions on a lattice, Ann. Prob., 2, 969
  22. 2002, Dynamics of rumor propagation on small-world networks, Phys. Rev. E, 65, 041908, 10.1103/PhysRevE.65.041908 · DOI
  23. 1998, Field theory of branching and annihilating random walks, J. Stat. Phys., 90, 1, 10.1023/A:1023233431588 · DOI
  24. 2002, Phase transitions in nonequilibrium d-dimensional models with q absorbing states, Phys. Rev. E, 65, 056114, 10.1103/PhysRevE.65.056114 · DOI
  25. 1967, The small world problem, Psychol. Today, 2, 60
  26. 2003, The structure and function of complex networks, SIAM Rev., 45, 167, 10.1137/S003614450342480 · DOI · Paper page
  27. 2002, Statistical mechanics of complex networks, Rev. Mod. Phys., 74, 47, 10.1103/RevModPhys.74.47 · DOI · Paper page
  28. 1998, Collective dynamics of ‘small world’ networks, Nature (London), 393, 440, 10.1038/30918 · DOI · Paper page
  29. 2000, Branching annihilating random walk on random regular graphs, Phys. Rev. E, 62, 7474, 10.1103/PhysRevE.62.7474 · DOI
  30. 1994, More spatial games, Int. J. Bifurcation Chaos Appl. Sci. Eng., 4, 33, 10.1142/S0218127494000046 · DOI
  31. 2001, Disordered environments in spatial games, Phys. Rev. E, 64, 051905, 10.1103/PhysRevE.64.051905 · DOI
  32. 2001, Social games in a social network, Phys. Rev. E, 63, 030901, 10.1103/PhysRevE.63.030901 · DOI
  33. 2002, Dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence: Prisoner’s dilemma game in small-world networks, Phys. Rev. E, 66, 021907, 10.1103/PhysRevE.66.021907 · DOI
  34. 2002, Coevolutionary games on networks, Phys. Rev. E, 66, 056118, 10.1103/PhysRevE.66.056118 · DOI
  35. 2002, Replicator dynamics in optional public goods games, J. Theor. Biol., 218, 187, 10.1006/jtbi.2002.3067 · DOI
  36. 2002, Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games with voluntary participation, Phys. Rev. E, 66, 062903, 10.1103/PhysRevE.66.062903 · DOI
  37. 1993, Paradoxical effect in a three-candidate voter model, Phys. Lett. A, 176, 303, 10.1016/0375-9601(93)90923-N · DOI
  38. 2001, Rock-scissors-paper and the survival of the weakest, Proc. R. Soc. London, Ser. B, 268, 1323, 10.1098/rspb.2001.1670 · DOI
  39. 2002, Local dispersal promotes biodiversity in a real-life game of rock-paper-scissors, Nature (London), 418, 171, 10.1038/nature00823 · DOI
  40. 2004, Cooperation for volunteering and partially random partnerships, Phys. Rev. E, 69, 036107, 10.1103/PhysRevE.69.036107 · DOI
  41. 2000, Spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with three strategies and external constraints, Phys. Rev. E, 62, 1095, 10.1103/PhysRevE.62.1095 · DOI
  42. 1996, Segregation in a one-dimensional model of interacting species, Phys. Rev. Lett., 77, 2125, 10.1103/PhysRevLett.77.2125 · DOI
  43. 2004, Rock-scissors-paper game on regular small-world networks, J. Phys. A, 37, 2599, 10.1088/0305-4470/37/7/006 · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Metadata

Authors
Hauert, C., & Szabó, G.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science (HU)
Venue
American Journal of Physics
Published
2005-04-13
Volume
73
Issue
5
Pages
405-414
ISSN
  • 0002-9505 (ISSN-L)
  • 1943-2909
OpenAlex
W1982151940
Cited by
511
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 26 · 2015: 25 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 38
FWCI
81.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
American Journal of Physics (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Applied Mathematics › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
evolutionary game theory, structured populations, evolution of cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, directed percolation, critical phase transition, small-world networks, random regular graphs, behavioral strategies, behavioral ecology

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review