Cooperation Through Image Scoring in Humans
Abstract
The "tragedy of the commons," that is, the selfish exploitation of resources in the public domain, is a reason for many of our everyday social conflicts. However, humans are often more helpful to others than evolutionary theory would predict, unless indirect reciprocity takes place and is based on image scoring (which reflects the way an individual is viewed by a group), as recently shown by game theorists. We tested this idea under conditions that control for confounding factors. Donations were more frequent to receivers who had been generous to others in earlier interactions. This shows that image scoring promotes cooperative behavior in situations where direct reciprocity is unlikely.
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If players know that their own score is passed on, they are much more likely to donate than otherwise.
“Conversely, if players know that their own score is passed on, they are much more likely to donate than otherwise 59,60 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [59]
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- Authors
- Wedekind, C., & Milinski, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Bern (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Wedekind, Claus
- Milinski, Manfred
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2000-05-05
- Volume
- 288
- Issue
- 5467
- Pages
- 850-852
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2059232881
- Cited by
- 877
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 34 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 45 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 42 · 2017: 48 · 2016: 40 · 2015: 46 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 47 · 2012: 41
- FWCI
- 80.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion, public-domain)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- indirect reciprocity, image scoring, cooperation, tragedy of the commons, social conflict, donations, generosity, public goods, evolutionary game theory
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Games, Experimental, Humans, Social Behavior, Social Perception
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