Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management
Open accessAbstract
Pulling Together: Human social norms can be explored in experiments that provide insights into the situational conditions and individual preferences that prompt the expression of cooperative behavior and the enforcement of norms. Rustagi et al. (p. 961 ; see the Perspective by Vollan and Ostrom ) analyzed a set of 49 user groups, comprising 679 individuals, who had been given the authority and responsibility to manage forests in the Bale region of Ethiopia. The forests managed by groups with larger proportions of conditional cooperators—that is, individuals who will behave in a cooperative fashion if others do so as well—produced more potential crop trees per hectare. Enforcing such behavior, via patrolling of the forests, which although a costly and time-intensive activity, was the key to productivity
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Most people behave like conditional cooperators, individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so.
“Moreover, it has also been observed that, in repeated public goods games, most people behave like conditional cooperators—individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so—and only a few individuals tend to be altruists (i.e., unconditional cooperators) or free-riders16,17,27,75,76.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [76]
In repeated public goods games, only a few individuals tend to be altruists or free-riders.
“Moreover, it has also been observed that, in repeated public goods games, most people behave like conditional cooperators—individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so—and only a few individuals tend to be altruists (i.e., unconditional cooperators) or free-riders16,17,27,75,76.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [76]
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“Groups that expend more effort and cost to monitor and cooperate conditionally more effectively manage their common pool of resources (Rustagi et al., 2010).”
BackgroundCooperation without punishment
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- Authors
- Rustagi, D., Engel, S., & Kosfeld, M.
- Affiliations
- ETH Zurich (CH)
- Goethe University Frankfurt (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Rustagi, Devesh
- Kosfeld, Michael
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2010-11-12
- Volume
- 330
- Issue
- 6006
- Pages
- 961-965
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2089152878
- Cited by
- 575
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2026: 24 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 40 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 40 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 38 · 2012: 34
- FWCI
- 80.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Global and Planetary Change › Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
- Keywords
- conditional cooperation, costly monitoring, prosocial behavior, gene-culture coevolution, social dilemmas, norm enforcement, forest user groups, natural experiment
- MeSH terms
- Conservation of Natural Resources, Cooperative Behavior, Ethiopia, Ethnicity, Games, Experimental, Humans, Social Behavior, Trees, Linear Models
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