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The Further Evolution of Cooperation
Abstract
Axelrod's model of the evolution of cooperation was based on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Empirical work following this approach has helped establish the prevalence of cooperation based on reciprocity. Theoretical work has led to a deeper understanding of the role of other factors in the evolution of cooperation: the number of players, the range of possible choices, variation in the payoff structure, noise, the shadow of the future, population dynamics, and population structure.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Axelrod, R., & Dion, D.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 1988-12-09
- Volume
- 242
- Issue
- 4884
- Pages
- 1385-1390
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2121885874
- Cited by
- 840
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 43.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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