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Cited by 185Global Public Health Policies and EpidemiologySmoking Behavior and CessationPolitical Influence and Corporate Strategies

What is known about tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco Tax? A systematic review of empirical studies

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Smith, Katherine E, Savell, Emily, Gilmore, Anna B·2013·Tobacco Control
DOI 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2011-050098PMC PMC3701860
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Abstract

OBJECTIVE: To systematically review studies of tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco tax policies. METHODS: Searches were conducted between 1 October 2009 and 31 March 2010 in 14 databases/websites, in relevant bibliographies and via experts. Studies were included if they focused on industry efforts to influence tobacco tax policies, drew on empirical evidence, were in English and concerned the period 1985-2010. In total, 36 studies met these criteria. Two reviewers undertook data extraction and critical appraisal. A random selection of 15 studies (42%) was subject to second review. Evidence was assessed thematically to identify distinct tobacco industry aims, arguments and tactics. RESULTS: A total of 34 studies examined industry efforts to influence tax levels. They suggest the tobacco industry works hard to prevent significant increases and particularly dislikes taxes 'earmarked' for tobacco control. Key arguments to counter increases are that tobacco taxes are socially regressive, unfair and lead to increased levels of illicit trade and negative economic impacts. For earmarked taxes, the industry also frequently tries to raise concerns about revenue allocation. Assessing industry arguments against established evidence demonstrates most are unsupported. Key industry tactics include: establishing 'front groups', securing credible allies, direct lobbying and publicity campaigns. Only seven studies examined efforts to influence tax structures. They suggest company preferences vary and tactics centre on direct lobbying. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco industry has historically tried to keep tobacco taxes low using consistent tactics and misleading arguments. Further research is required to explore efforts to influence tax structures, excise policies beyond the USA and recent policies.

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  • Existing studies on how tobacco control policy is passed at the national level focus more on tactics used by opponents rather than proponents.

    “Moreover, existing studies on how tobacco control policy is passed at the national level are focused more on tactics used by opponents (eg, lobbying, litigation, protests and other tactics to delay or subvert policy passage) rather than proponents,25–32 with few exceptions.33–36”

    From Seven-year tobacco tax plan in Ukraine: a case study of the actors, tactics and factors motivating policy passage (2022) · cites this paper as [28]

    The section on industry tactics documents studies of opponents’ lobbying, legal challenges and other efforts to block tobacco tax increases. But the review is limited to tobacco taxation, does not compare the literature on opponents with that on proponents, and says most studies of tax increases examined US state-level initiatives—not national-level tobacco control policymaking generally (Results; The success of tobacco industry efforts to keep tobacco taxes low and prevent earmarking; pages unavailable). (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  • Powerful actors in countries across the globe and across industries threatened by policy change similarly use lobbying to water down policy to their benefit, sometimes behind closed doors.

    “Additionally, like the tobacco industry in Ukraine, powerful actors in countries across the globe and across industries threatened by policy change similarly use lobbying to water down policy to their benefit, sometimes behind closed doors.20–22 24–26 28 33 34 63–65”

    From Seven-year tobacco tax plan in Ukraine: a case study of the actors, tactics and factors motivating policy passage (2022) · cites this paper as [28]

    The section on tactics to keep tobacco taxes low reports direct lobbying of policymakers and the use of front groups and third parties to conceal tobacco-industry involvement. The Conclusion cautions that the evidence is heavily biased toward the US and limited elsewhere. The paper therefore supports the tobacco-industry example, but not the claim’s extension to actors across industries and countries across the globe. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The majority of the substantial body of literature on TII is based on HICs.

    “Furthermore, while there is a substantial body of literature on TII, the majority is based on HICs.13–15”

    From Needs of LMIC-based tobacco control advocates to counter tobacco industry policy interference: insights from semi-structured interviews (2020) · cites this paper as [13]

    The Results (‘Tobacco industry aims and study context’; page not provided) report that only five of 34 studies on efforts to influence tobacco tax levels concerned policies outside North America. The Conclusion also describes a strong bias toward the US, a high-income country. This supports the geographic point for tobacco-tax influence studies, but the review does not establish that the majority of the broader literature on tobacco industry interference is based on high-income countries. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Authors
Smith, K. E., Savell, E., & Gilmore, A. B.
Affiliations
  • University of Edinburgh (GB)
  • University of Bath (GB)
  • London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (GB)
Corresponding author
Smith, Katherine E
ORCID
Venue
Tobacco Control
Publisher
BMJ
Published
2012-08-12
Volume
22
Issue
2
Pages
e1-e1
ISSN
  • 0964-4563 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-3318
DOI
10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2011-050098
PMC
PMC3701860
OpenAlex
W2114487458
Cited by
185
References
1
Citations by year
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FWCI
2.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Tobacco Control (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Strathprints: The University of Strathclyde institutional repository (University of Strathclyde) (acceptedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
  • The University of Bath Online Publications Store (The University of Bath) (submittedVersion)
  • Pure (University of Bath) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • LSHTM Research Online (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • United Kingdom Clinical Research Collaboration
  • Cancer Research UK
  • British Heart Foundation
  • European Commission (223323)
  • University of Bath
  • National Institutes of Health
  • Medical Research Council (MR/K023195/1)
  • Economic and Social Research Council (ES/I000119/1)
  • National Cancer Institute (R01CA160695)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Physiology › Smoking Behavior and Cessation
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Keywords
tobacco industry, tobacco taxation, industry lobbying, earmarked taxes, tobacco control funding, front groups, lobbying tactics, excise tax, illicit tobacco trade, tax revenue distribution
MeSH terms
Humans, Lobbying, Public Policy, Taxes, Tobacco Industry, Tobacco Products

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