The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Privacy Amplification by Public Discussion
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how the use of a channel with perfect authenticity but no privacy can be used to repair the defects of a channel with imperfect privacy but no authenticity. More precisely, let us assume that Alice and Bob wish to agree on a secret random bit string, and have at their disposal an imperfect private channel and a perfect public channel. The private channel is imperfect in various ways: transmission errors can occur, and partial information can leak to an eavesdropper, Eve, who also has the power to suppress, inject, and modify transmissions arbitrarily. On the other hand, the public channel transmits information accurately, and these transmissions cannot be modified or suppressed by Eve, but their entire contents becomes known to her. We consider the situation in which a random bit string x has already been transmitted from Alice to Bob over the private channel, and we describe interactive public channel protocols that allow them, with high probability: (1) to assess the extent to which the private channel transmission has been corrupted by tampering and channel noise; and (2) if this corruption is not too severe, to repair Bob’s partial ignorance of the transmitted string and Eve’s partial knowledge of it by distilling from the transmitted and received versions of the string another string, in general shorter than x, upon which Alice and Bob have perfect information, while Eve has nearly no information (or in some cases exactly none), except for its length. These protocols remain secure against unlimited computing power.
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Cited by
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Self-citationFuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
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Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bennett, C. H., Brassard, G., & Robert, J.-M.
- Venue
- SIAM Journal on Computing
- Published
- 1988-04
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 210-229
- ISSN
- 0097-5397 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-7111
- OpenAlex
- W2007661134
- Cited by
- 867
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 2.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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