The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
Abstract
This paper explores the way in which assortative matching can maintain cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics. If encounters are random, then in Prisoner's Dilemma games, defectors necessarily get higher payoffs than cooperators and thus will eventually prevail. But if matching is assortative, the cost of cooperating may be repaid by higher probabilities of playing against a cooperating opponent. This paper shows that a simple index of assortativity allows a unifying treatment of the evolutionary dynamics in a wide variety of models of social encounters.
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Citations
Cites
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Cited by
Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
(2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10637 · Cited by 371
Evolution of parochial altruism by multilevel selection
García, J., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2011) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.07.007 · Cited by 120
Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric social interactions
Su, Q., Allen, B., & Plotkin, J. B. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2113468118 · Cited by 104
Metadata
- Authors
- Bergstrom, T. C.
- Venue
- International Game Theory Review
- Publisher
- World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
- Published
- 2003-09
- Volume
- 05
- Issue
- 03
- Pages
- 211-228
- ISSN
- 0219-1989 (ISSN-L)
- 1793-6675
- OpenAlex
- W2138750606
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 17.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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