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Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence From Board Structures and Charter Provisions

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Gillan, Stuart L., Hartzell, Jay C., Starks, Laura T. · 2011 · Quarterly Journal of Finance

Abstract

We provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are composed of interrelated mechanisms, which are in turn endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose those mechanisms. Examining board structures and the use of corporate charter provisions in a sample of more than 2,300 firms over a four-year period, we find that firms cluster in their use of governance mechanisms. In particular, the set of charter provisions that firms use, as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003) G Index, is associated with board structure, with the laws of the state in which the firm is incorporated, and with firm and industry characteristics. We also find that some governance structures appear to serve as substitutes. Specifically, firms that have powerful boards (as measured by board independence) also have the greatest number of charter provisions, suggesting that the market for corporate control is less effective as a monitoring mechanism for these firms. In contrast, firms that have less powerful boards tend to have few charter provisions, suggesting that the market for corporate control plays a greater monitoring role at such firms. To address potential endogeneity issues, we employ three-stage least squares analysis to estimate these relationships within a system of equations. Our results from this analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that powerful boards serve as a substitute for the market for corporate control. Finally, our findings suggest that causality runs from the board to the choice of charter provisions, but not vice versa.

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Metadata

Authors
Gillan, S. L., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T.
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Finance
Published
2011-12
Volume
01
Issue
04
Pages
667-705
ISSN
  • 2010-1392 (ISSN-L)
  • 2010-1406
OpenAlex
W3122055225
Cited by
158
References
7
FWCI
52.63
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence From Board Structures and Charter Provisions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1142/s2010139211000183
The paper
Gillan, S. L., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2011). Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence From Board Structures and Charter Provisions. Quarterly Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139211000183

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.