Protecting your daily in-home activity information from a wireless snooping attack
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Abstract
In this paper, we first present a new privacy leak in residential wireless ubiquitous computing systems, and then we propose guidelines for designing future systems to prevent this problem. We show that we can observe private activities in the home such as cooking, showering, toileting, and sleeping by eavesdropping on the wireless transmissions of sensors in a home, even when all of the transmissions are encrypted. We call this the Fingerprint and Timing-based Snooping (FATS) attack. This attack can already be carried out on millions of homes today, and may become more important as ubiquitous computing environments such as smart homes and assisted living facilities become more prevalent. In this paper, we demonstrate and evaluate the FATS attack on eight different homes containing wireless sensors. We also propose and evaluate a set of privacy preserving design guidelines for future wireless ubiquitous systems and show how these guidelines can be used in a hybrid fashion to prevent against the FATS attack with low implementation costs.
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Citations
Cited by
Wireless sensor networks for healthcare: A survey
Alemdar, H., & Ersoy, C. (2010) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2010.05.003 · Cited by 1,427
Wireless Sensor Networks for Healthcare
Ko, J., Lu, C., Srivastava, M. B., Stankovic, J. A., Terzis, A., & Welsh, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2010.2065210 · Cited by 733
Self-citationWearable and implantable wireless sensor network solutions for healthcare monitoring
Darwish, A., & Hassanien, A. E. (2011) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s110605561 · Cited by 556
“[98] has discussed a wireless sensor system privacy leak called Fingerprint and Timing-based Snooping attacks that can happen even if the wireless communication is encrypted.”
BackgroundThe smart thermostat: using occupancy sensors to save energy in homes
Lu, J., Sookoor, T., Srinivasan, V., Gao, G., Holben, B., Stankovic, J., Field, E., & Whitehouse, K. (2010) · Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems · doi:10.1145/1869983.1870005 · Cited by 502
Self-citationUser Perceptions of Smart Home IoT Privacy
Zheng, S., Apthorpe, N., Chetty, M., & Feamster, N. (2018) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3274469 · Cited by 423
Implantable devices: issues and challenges
Bazaka, K., & Jacob, M. (2012) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics2010001 · Cited by 358
“This is achieved by detecting the unique set of RF waveform features pertaining to a transmitter, so called fingerprint, and the timing of each transmission [125].”
Peek-a-boo: i see your smart home activities, even encrypted!
Acar, A., Fereidooni, H., Abera, T., Sikder, A. K., Miettinen, M., Aksu, H., Conti, M., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Uluagac, S. (2020) · Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks · doi:10.1145/3395351.3399421 · Cited by 264
Privacy in mobile technology for personal healthcare
Avancha, S., Baxi, A., & Kotz, D. (2012) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2379776.2379779 · Cited by 229
“…or SN exposes PHI, keys, SN types, sensing tasks data in transit: outsiders eavesdrop on SN-MN, MN-PHR, PHR-PHR, PHR-client; traf.c analysis and/or content decryption [Srinivasan et al. 2008, for example] outsiders observe presence and type of sensors on patient [Halperin et al. 2008b]…”
BackgroundInfluentialKeeping the Smart Home Private with Smart(er) IoT Traffic Shaping
Apthorpe, N., Huang, D. Y., Reisman, D., Narayanan, A., & Feamster, N. (2019) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.2478/popets-2019-0040 · Cited by 192
“The attack we describe is similar in spirit to the Finger-print and Timing-based Snooping (FATS) attack presented by Srinivasan et al. in 2008 [39].”
Spying on the Smart Home: Privacy Attacks and Defenses on Encrypted IoT Traffic
Apthorpe, N., Reisman, D., Sundaresan, S., Narayanan, A., & Feamster, N. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1708.05044 · Cited by 173
“The attack we describe is similar in spirit to the Fingerprint and Timing-based Snooping (FATS) attack presented by Srinivasan et al. [36].”
ResultEthics of the health-related internet of things: a narrative review
Mittelstadt, B. (2017) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-017-9426-4 · Cited by 154
Post-Quantum Era Privacy Protection for Intelligent Infrastructures
Malina, L., Dzurenda, P., Ricci, S., Hajny, J., Srivastava, G., Matulevicius, R., Affia, A.-A. O., Laurent, M., Sultan, N. H., & Tang, Q. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3062201 · Cited by 111
A threat taxonomy for mHealth privacy
Kotz, D. (2011) · 2011 Third International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS 2011) · doi:10.1109/comsnets.2011.5716518 · Cited by 101
Cyber Security Challenges of Deploying IoT in Smart Cities for Healthcare Applications
Alromaihi, S., Elmedany, W., & Balakrishna, C. (2018) · 2018 6th International Conference on Future Internet of Things and Cloud Workshops (FiCloudW) · doi:10.1109/w-ficloud.2018.00028 · Cited by 58
“For initiating such attack, the time of transmission and the fingerprint of each message are needed only, which is known as the fingerprint and timingbased snooping (FATS) attack [28].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Srinivasan, V., Stankovic, J., & Whitehouse, K.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Ubiquitous computing
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2008-09-21
- Pages
- 202-211
- OpenAlex
- W2051552208
- Cited by
- 140
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.90
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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