Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with the multinomial naïve-bayes classifier
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Privacy enhancing technologies like OpenSSL, OpenVPN or Tor establish an encrypted tunnel that enables users to hide content and addresses of requested websites from external observers This protection is endangered by local traffic analysis attacks that allow an external, passive attacker between the PET system and the user to uncover the identity of the requested sites. However, existing proposals for such attacks are not practicable yet.
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Cites
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Cited by
Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale
Panchenko, A., Lanze, F., Zinnen, A., Henze, M., Pennekamp, J., Wehrle, K., & Engel, T. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23477 · Cited by 645
“[11] were the first to apply website fingerprinting to the anonymization networks JAP [2] and Tor [8] as well as on OpenSSH, OpenVPN, Stunnel, and Cisco IPsec-VPN.”
BackgroundMethodDeep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with Deep Learning
Sirinam, P., Imani, M., Juarez, M., & Wright, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243768 · Cited by 592
“The closed-world assumption was criticized for being unrealistic [13, 24, 15], as the world of sites that can be potentially visited is so large that not even the most powerful adversaries have the resources to collect data”
BackgroundInfluentialAceto, G., Ciuonzo, D., Montieri, A., & Pescape, A. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · doi:10.1109/tnsm.2019.2899085 · Cited by 519
Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks
Panchenko, A., Niessen, L., Zinnen, A., & Engel, T. (2011) · Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society · doi:10.1145/2046556.2046570 · Cited by 501
Peek-a-Boo, I Still See You: Why Efficient Traffic Analysis Countermeasures Fail
Dyer, K. P., Coull, S. E., Ristenpart, T., & Shrimpton, T. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.28 · Cited by 456
Robust Smartphone App Identification via Encrypted Network Traffic Analysis
Taylor, V. F., Spolaor, R., Conti, M., & Martinovic, I. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2017.2737970 · Cited by 439
“Subsequently, Herman et al. [17] outperformed Liberatore et al. by presenting a method that relies on common text mining techniques to the normalized frequency distribution of observable IP packet sizes.”
MethodTouching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses
Cai, X., Zhang, X. C., Joshi, B., & Johnson, R. (2012) · Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382260 · Cited by 394
AppScanner: Automatic Fingerprinting of Smartphone Apps from Encrypted Network Traffic
Taylor, V. F., Spolaor, R., Conti, M., & Martinovic, I. (2016) · 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2016.40 · Cited by 390
A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Juarez, M., Afroz, S., Acar, G., Diaz, C., & Greenstadt, R. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660368 · Cited by 327
“Website fingerprinting; Tor; privacy”
InfluentialMemGuard: Defending against Black-Box Membership Inference Attacks via Adversarial Examples
Jia, J., Salem, A., Backes, M., Zhang, Y., & Gong, N. Z. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3363201 · Cited by 324
Improved website fingerprinting on Tor
Wang, T., & Goldberg, I. (2013) · Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society · doi:10.1145/2517840.2517851 · Cited by 295
A Systematic Approach to Developing and Evaluating Website Fingerprinting Defenses
Cai, X., Nithyanand, R., Wang, T., Johnson, R., & Goldberg, I. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660362 · Cited by 284
A Survey on Encrypted Network Traffic Analysis Applications, Techniques, and Countermeasures
Papadogiannaki, E., & Ioannidis, S. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3457904 · Cited by 281
Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense
Juarez, M., Imani, M., Perry, M., Diaz, C., & Wright, M. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45744-4_2 · Cited by 273
Analyzing Android Encrypted Network Traffic to Identify User Actions
Conti, M., Mancini, L. V., Spolaor, R., & Verde, N. V. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2015.2478741 · Cited by 266
Adaptive encrypted traffic fingerprinting with bi-directional dependence
Al-Naami, K., Chandra, S., Mustafa, A., Khan, L., Lin, Z., Hamlen, K., & Thuraisingham, B. (2016) · Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference on Computer Security Applications · doi:10.1145/2991079.2991123 · Cited by 145
Riffle: An Efficient Communication System With Strong Anonymity
Kwon, A., Lazar, D., Devadas, S., & Ford, B. (2016) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.1515/popets-2016-0008 · Cited by 84
“However, such systems are susceptible to traffic analysis attacks [36, 43] by powerful adversaries such as an authoritarian government or a state controlled ISP, and have recently been attacked by even weaker adversaries monitoring only the users’ traffic [14, 32, 39, 51].”
A multi-level framework to identify HTTPS services
Shbair, W. M., Cholez, T., Francois, J., & Chrisment, I. (2016) · NOMS 2016 - 2016 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium · doi:10.1109/noms.2016.7502818 · Cited by 69
Yang, J., Liang, G., Li, B., Wen, G., & Gao, T. (2021) · Electronics Letters · doi:10.1049/ell2.12125 · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Herrmann, D., Wendolsky, R., & Federrath, H.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2009-11-13
- Pages
- 31-42
- OpenAlex
- W2108217512
- Cited by
- 424
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 7.29
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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