The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Binary stirring: self-randomizing instruction addresses of legacy x86 binary code
Abstract
Unlike library code, whose instruction addresses can be randomized by address space layout randomization (ASLR), application binary code often has static instruction addresses. Attackers can exploit this limitation to craft robust shell codes for such applications, as demonstrated by a recent attack that reuses instruction gadgets from the static binary code of victim applications.
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Citations
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“The underlying idea is to randomize the code structure, for instance, by shuffling functions, basic blocks, or instructions (ideally for each program run [117], [118]).”
BackgroundOut of Control: Overcoming Control-Flow Integrity
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wartell, R., Mohan, V., Hamlen, K. W., & Lin, Z.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2012-10-16
- Pages
- 157-168
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2168843528
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 26.59
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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