The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys
Abstract
This paper details the construction of an access-driven side-channel attack by which a malicious virtual machine (VM) extracts fine-grained information from a victim VM running on the same physical computer. This attack is the first such attack demonstrated on a symmetric multiprocessing system virtualized using a modern VMM (Xen). Such systems are very common today, ranging from desktops that use virtualization to sandbox application or OS compromises, to clouds that co-locate the workloads of mutually distrustful customers. Constructing such a side-channel requires overcoming challenges including core migration, numerous sources of channel noise, and the difficulty of preempting the victim with sufficient frequency to extract fine-grained information from it. This paper addresses these challenges and demonstrates the attack in a lab setting by extracting an ElGamal decryption key from a victim using the most recent version of the libgcrypt cryptographic library.
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Cites
LIBSVM: A library for support vector machines
Chang, C.-C., & Lin, C.-J. (2011) · ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology · doi:10.1145/1961189.1961199 · Cited by 40,918
Book Review: Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning
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A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
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A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1983) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/357980.358017 · Cited by 13,012
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Armbrust, M., Fox, A., Griffith, R., Joseph, A. D., Katz, R., Konwinski, A., Lee, G., Patterson, D., Rabkin, A., Stoica, I., et al. (2010) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/1721654.1721672 · Cited by 9,464
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Elgamal, T. (1985) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1985.1057074 · Cited by 8,059
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Error bounds for convolutional codes and an asymptotically optimum decoding algorithm
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Xen and the art of virtualization
Barham, P., Dragovic, B., Fraser, K., Hand, S., Harris, T., Ho, A., Neugebauer, R., Pratt, I., & Warfield, A. (2003) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1165389.945462 · Cited by 5,915
Cited by
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., Schwarz, M., & Yarom, Y. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01203 · Cited by 1,850
Security issues in cloud environments: a survey
Fernandes, D. A. B., Soares, L. F. B., Gomes, J. V., Freire, M. M., & Inácio, P. R. M. (2014) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-013-0208-7 · Cited by 494
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX
Wang, W., Chen, G., Pan, X., Zhang, Y., Wang, X., Bindschaedler, V., Tang, H., & Gunter, C. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134038 · Cited by 320
Self-citationSgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution
Chen, G., Chen, S., Xiao, Y., Zhang, Y., Lin, Z., & Lai, T. H. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00020 · Cited by 319
Self-citationWait a Minute! A fast, Cross-VM Attack on AES
Irazoqui, G., Inci, M. S., Eisenbarth, T., & Sunar, B. (2014) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_15 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2012-10-16
- Pages
- 305-316
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1992291252
- Cited by
- 787
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 57.86
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T. (2012). Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys. Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382230
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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