Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper details the construction of an access-driven side-channel attack by which a malicious virtual machine (VM) extracts fine-grained information from a victim VM running on the same physical computer. This attack is the first such attack demonstrated on a symmetric multiprocessing system virtualized using a modern VMM (Xen). Such systems are very common today, ranging from desktops that use virtualization to sandbox application or OS compromises, to clouds that co-locate the workloads of mutually distrustful customers. Constructing such a side-channel requires overcoming challenges including core migration, numerous sources of channel noise, and the difficulty of preempting the victim with sufficient frequency to extract fine-grained information from it. This paper addresses these challenges and demonstrates the attack in a lab setting by extracting an ElGamal decryption key from a victim using the most recent version of the libgcrypt cryptographic library.
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2012-10-16
- Pages
- 305-316
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1992291252
- Cited by
- 787
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 57.86
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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