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Comprehensive formal verification of an OS microkernel
Abstract
We present an in-depth coverage of the comprehensive machine-checked formal verification of seL4, a general-purpose operating system microkernel. We discuss the kernel design we used to make its verification tractable. We then describe the functional correctness proof of the kernel's C implementation and we cover further steps that transform this result into a comprehensive formal verification of the kernel: a formally verified IPC fastpath, a proof that the binary code of the kernel correctly implements the C semantics, a proof of correct access-control enforcement, a proof of information-flow noninterference, a sound worst-case execution time analysis of the binary, and an automatic initialiser for user-level systems that connects kernel-level access-control enforcement with reasoning about system behaviour. We summarise these results and show how they integrate to form a coherent overall analysis, backed by machine-checked, end-to-end theorems. The seL4 microkernel is currently not just the only general-purpose operating system kernel that is fully formally verified to this degree. It is also the only example of formal proof of this scale that is kept current as the requirements, design and implementation of the system evolve over almost a decade. We report on our experience in maintaining this evolving formally verified code base.
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Self-citationIronFleet: proving practical distributed systems correct
Hawblitzel, C., Howell, J., Kapritsos, M., Lorch, J. R., Parno, B., Roberts, M. L., Setty, S., & Zill, B. (2015) · Proceedings of the 25th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles · doi:10.1145/2815400.2815428 · Cited by 320
SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Cremers, C., Liao, K., & Parno, B. (2021) · 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00008 · Cited by 143
Virtualizing mixed-criticality systems: A survey on industrial trends and issues
Cinque, M., Cotroneo, D., De Simone, L., & Rosiello, S. (2022) · Future Generation Computer Systems · doi:10.1016/j.future.2021.12.002 · Cited by 80
A New Approach to Cyberphysical Security in Industry 4.0
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Metadata
- Authors
- Klein, G., Andronick, J., Elphinstone, K., Murray, T., Sewell, T., Kolanski, R., & Heiser, G.
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Computer Systems
- Published
- 2014-02
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-70
- ISSN
- 0734-2071 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7333
- OpenAlex
- W2163347957
- Cited by
- 348
- References
- 120
- FWCI
- 40.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.