Hypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
TrustZone-based Real-time Kernel Protection (TZ-RKP) is a novel system that provides real-time protection of the OS kernel using the ARM TrustZone secure world. TZ-RKP is more secure than current approaches that use hypervisors to host kernel protection tools. Although hypervisors provide privilege and isolation, they face fundamental security challenges due to their growing complexity and code size. TZ-RKP puts its security monitor, which represents its entire Trusted Computing Base (TCB), in the TrustZone secure world; a safe isolated environment that is dedicated to security services. Hence, the security monitor is safe from attacks that can potentially compromise the kernel, which runs in the normal world. Using the secure world for kernel protection has been crippled by the lack of control over targets that run in the normal world. TZ-RKP solves this prominent challenge using novel techniques that deprive the normal world from the ability to control certain privileged system functions. These functions are forced to route through the secure world for inspection and approval before being executed. TZ-RKP's control of the normal world is non-bypassable. It can effectively stop attacks that aim at modifying or injecting kernel binaries. It can also stop attacks that involve modifying the system memory layout, e.g, through memory double mapping. This paper presents the implementation and evaluation of TZ-RKP, which has gone through rigorous and thorough evaluation of effectiveness and performance. It is currently deployed on the latest models of the Samsung Galaxy series smart phones and tablets, which clearly demonstrates that it is a practical real-world system.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Boneh, D. (2002) · Cited by 2,530
Klein, G., Elphinstone, K., Heiser, G., Andronick, J., Cock, D., Derrin, P., Elkaduwe, D., Engelhardt, K., Kolanski, R., Norrish, M., et al. (2009) · Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/1629575.1629596 · Cited by 1,633
A Virtual Machine Introspection Based Architecture for Intrusion Detection.
Garfinkel, T., & Rosenblum, M. (2003) · Cited by 1,323
The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86)
Shacham, H. (2007) · Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1315245.1315313 · Cited by 1,280
Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing
Garfinkel, T., Pfaff, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., & Boneh, D. (2003) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1165389.945464 · Cited by 887
Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization
McCune, J. M., Parno, B. J., Perrig, A., Reiter, M. K., & Isozaki, H. (2008) · Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008 · doi:10.1145/1352592.1352625 · Cited by 640
SecVisor: a tiny hypervisor to provide lifetime kernel code integrity for commodity OSes
Seshadri, A., Luk, M., Qu, N., & Perrig, A. (2007) · Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/1294261.1294294 · Cited by 629
TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation
McCune, J. M., Li, Y., Qu, N., Zhou, Z., Datta, A., Gligor, V., & Perrig, A. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.17 · Cited by 541
Stealthy malware detection through vmm-based "out-of-the-box" semantic view reconstruction
Jiang, X., Wang, X., & Xu, D. (2007) · Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1315245.1315262 · Cited by 494
Practical Control Flow Integrity and Randomization for Binary Executables
Zhang, C., Wei, T., Chen, Z., Duan, L., Szekeres, L., McCamant, S., Song, D., & Zou, W. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.44 · Cited by 482
Lares: An Architecture for Secure Active Monitoring Using Virtualization
Payne, B. D., Carbone, M., Sharif, M., & Lee, W. (2008) · 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008) · doi:10.1109/sp.2008.24 · Cited by 414
Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing
Garfinkel, T., Pfaff, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., & Boneh, D. (2003) · Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/945445.945464 · Cited by 408
When good instructions go bad: generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC
Buchanan, E., Roemer, R., Shacham, H., & Savage, S. (2008) · Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1455770.1455776 · Cited by 362
Out of Control: Overcoming Control-Flow Integrity
Goktas, E., Athanasopoulos, E., Bos, H., & Portokalidis, G. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.43 · Cited by 361
NOVA: a microhypervisor-based secure virtualization architecture
Steinberg, U., & Kauer, B. (2010) · Proceedings of the 5th European conference on Computer systems · doi:10.1145/1755913.1755935 · Cited by 313
Automated detection of persistent kernel control-flow attacks
Petroni, N. L., & Hicks, M. (2007) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1315245.1315260 · Cited by 301
ROPecker: A Generic and Practical Approach For Defending Against ROP Attacks
Cheng, Y., Zhou, Z., Yu, M., Ding, X., & Deng, R. H. (2014) · Proceedings 2014 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2014.23156 · Cited by 279
Secure in-VM monitoring using hardware virtualization
Sharif, M. I., Lee, W., Cui, W., & Lanzi, A. (2009) · Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653720 · Cited by 278
HyperSentry: enabling stealthy in-context measurement of hypervisor integrity
Azab, A. M., Ning, P., Wang, Z., Jiang, X., Zhang, X., & Skalsky, N. C. (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866313 · Cited by 266
Self-citationReturn-oriented rootkits: bypassing kernel code integrity protection mechanisms
Hund, R., Holz, T., & Freiling, F. (2009) · Cited by 215
Hypervisor support for identifying covertly executing binaries
Litty, L., Lagar-Cavilla, H. A., & Lie, D. (2008) · Cited by 198
KCoFI: Complete Control-Flow Integrity for Commodity Operating System Kernels
Criswell, J., Dautenhahn, N., & Adve, V. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.26 · Cited by 172
Criswell, J., Lenharth, A., Dhurjati, D., & Adve, V. (2007) · ACM SIGOPS Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP) · doi:10.1145/1294261.1294295 · Cited by 164
Kil, C., Sezer, E. C., Azab, A. M., Ning, P., & Zhang, X. (2009) · International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/dsn.2009.5270348 · Cited by 158
Self-citationHyperCheck: A Hardware-Assisted Integrity Monitor
Wang, J., Stavrou, A., & Ghosh, A. K. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15512-3_9 · Cited by 157
MoCFI: A Framework to Mitigate Control-Flow Attacks on Smartphones
Davi, L., Dmitrienko, A., Egele, M., Fischer, T., Holz, T., Hund, R., Nürnberger, S., & Sadeghi, A. (2012) · Cited by 153
Sprobes: Enforcing Kernel Code Integrity on the TrustZone ArchitecturePreprint
Ge, X., Vijayakumar, H., & Jaeger, T. (2014) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1410.7747 · Cited by 145
Lange, M., Liebergeld, S., Lackorzyński, A., et al. (2011) · doi:10.1145/2046614.2046623 · Cited by 125
kGuard: Lightweight Kernel Protection against Return-to-user Attacks
Kemerlis, V. P., Portokalidis, G., & Keromytis, A. D. (n.d.) · Cited by 103
Bickford, J., O’Hare, R., Baliga, A., Ganapathy, V., & Iftode, L. (2010) · IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (WMCSA) · doi:10.1145/1734583.1734596 · Cited by 100
SecureME: a hardware-software approach to full system security
Chhabra, S., Rogers, B. M., Solihin, Y., & Prvulović, M. (2011) · International Conference on Supercomputing · doi:10.1145/1995896.1995914 · Cited by 79
Cloaker: Hardware Supported Rootkit Concealment
David, F. M., Chan, E. M., Carlyle, J. C., & Campbell, R. H. (2008) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2008.8 · Cited by 54
CPU transparent protection of OS kernel and hypervisor integrity with programmable DRAM
Liu, Z., Lee, J., Zeng, J., Wen, Y., Lin, Z., & Shi, W. L. (2013) · Proceedings - International Symposium on Computer Architecture/Proceedings · doi:10.1145/2485922.2485956 · Cited by 37
Cited by
Trusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not
Sabt, M., Achemlal, M., & Bouabdallah, A. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA · doi:10.1109/trustcom.2015.357 · Cited by 724
Demystifying Arm TrustZone: A Comprehensive Survey
Pinto, S., & Santos, N. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3291047 · Cited by 505
Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments
Lee, D., Kohlbrenner, D., Shinde, S., Asanović, K., & Song, D. (2020) · Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3342195.3387532 · Cited by 379
Gupta, R., Tanwar, S., Al-Turjman, F., Italiya, P., Nauman, A., & Kim, S. W. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2970576 · Cited by 256
No Need to Hide: Protecting Safe Regions on Commodity Hardware
Koning, K., Chen, X., Bos, H., Giuffrida, C., & Athanasopoulos, E. (2017) · Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3064176.3064217 · Cited by 116
Metadata
- Authors
- Azab, A. M., Ning, P., Shah, J., Chen, Q., Bhutkar, R., Ganesh, G., Ma, J., & Shen, W.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2014-11-03
- Pages
- 90-102
- OpenAlex
- W2168872572
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 17.00
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.