Sybil-Resistant Mixing for Bitcoin
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental limitation of Bitcoin and its variants is that the movement of coin between addresses can be observed by examining the public block chain. This record enables adversaries to link addresses to individuals, and to identify multiple addresses as belonging to a single participant. Users can try to hide this information by mixing, where a participant exchanges the funds in an address coin-for-coin with another participant and address. In this paper, we describe the weaknesses of extant mixing protocols, and analyze their vulnerability to Sybil-based denial-of-service and inference attacks. As a solution, we propose Xim, a two-party mixing protocol that is compatible with Bitcoin and related virtual currencies. It is the first decentralized protocol to simultaneously address Sybil attackers, denial-of-service attacks, and timing-based inference attacks. Xim is a multi-round protocol with tunably high success rates. It includes a decentralized system for anonymously finding mix partners based on ads placed in the block chain. No outside party can confirm or find evidence of participants that pair up. We show that Xim's design increases attacker costs linearly with the total number of participants, and that its probabilistic approach to mixing mitigates Sybil-based denial-of-service attack effects. We evaluate protocol delays based on our measurements of the Bitcoin network.
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Citations
Cites
Douceur, J. R. (2002) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24 · Cited by 4,419 · cited 2×
“Our solution, Xim, is a protocol that functions correctly in the presence of malicious mixing partners, forces Sybil attackers [12] to pay costs at least linear to the number of participants in the mix and is more robust against denial-of-service attacks than previous approaches.”
BackgroundMethodTor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P. (2004) · doi:10.21236/ada465464 · Cited by 4,104
Zerocoin: Anonymous Distributed E-Cash from Bitcoin
Miers, I., Garman, C., Green, M., & Rubin, A. D. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.34 · Cited by 983 · cited 2×
“(ZeroCoin [18] and ZeroCash [8] are both decentralized; but neither is backwards compatible with Bitcoin or its related currencies.”
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Androulaki, E., Karame, G. O., Roeschlin, M., Scherer, T., & Capkun, S. (2013) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39884-1_4 · Cited by 700
Mixcoin: Anonymity for Bitcoin with Accountable Mixes
Bonneau, J., Narayanan, A., Miller, A., Clark, J., Kroll, J. A., & Felten, E. W. (2014) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5_31 · Cited by 441 · cited 2×
“MixCoin [10] allows centralized mixes to issue warranties, which users can redeem to damage the mix’s reputation if it fails in its promises.”
Background
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Tschorsch, F., & Scheuermann, B. (2016) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2016.2535718 · Cited by 1,690
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“In [38], [41], [42], mixing protocols are analyzed.”
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“Another decentralized mixing service is presented in [235] that is named Xim.”
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ValueShuffle: Mixing Confidential Transactions for Comprehensive Transaction Privacy in Bitcoin
Ruffing, T., & Moreno-Sanchez, P. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_8 · Cited by 73
An Integrated Reward and Reputation Mechanism for MCS Preserving Users’ Privacy
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bissias, G., Ozisik, A. P., Levine, B. N., & Liberatore, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2014-11-03
- Pages
- 149-158
- OpenAlex
- W1974997379
- Cited by
- 147
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 7.41
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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