The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The SLam calculus: programming with secrecy and integrity
Abstract
The SLam calculus is a typed λ-calculus that maintains security information as well as type information. The type system propagates security information for each object in four forms: the object's creators and readers, and the object's indirect creators and readers (i.e., those agents who, through flow-of-control or the actions of other agents, can influence or be influenced by the content of the object). We prove that the type system prevents security violations and give some examples of its power.
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Cites
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BackgroundSecure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
Smith, G., & Volpano, D. (1998) · Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL '98 · doi:10.1145/268946.268975 · Cited by 406
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Cited by
TaintDroid: an information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones
Enck, W., Gilbert, P., Chun, B.-G., Cox, L. P., Jung, J., McDaniel, P. D., & Sheth, A. N. (2010) · doi:10.5555/1924943.1924971 · Cited by 2,238
Language-based information-flow security
Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C. (2003) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2002.806121 · Cited by 1,907
Enck (2014) · doi:10.1145/2619091 · Cited by 1,203
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
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Qin, F., Wang, C., Li, Z., Kim, H.-S., Zhou, Y., & Wu, Y. (2006) · 2006 39th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO'06) · doi:10.1109/micro.2006.29 · Cited by 422
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Self-citationSecure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
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Agat, J. (2000) · Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/325694.325702 · Cited by 340
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Abadi, M. (1999) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/324133.324266 · Cited by 314
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Observational determinism for concurrent program security
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RIFLE: An Architectural Framework for User-Centric Information-Flow Security
Vachharajani, N., Bridges, M. J., Chang, J., Rangan, R., Ottoni, G., Blome, J. A., Reis, G. A., Vachharajani, M., & August, D. I. (2005) · 37th International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO-37'04) · doi:10.1109/micro.2004.31 · Cited by 270
Information flow inference for ML
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A Core Quantitative Coeffect Calculus
Brunel, A., Gaboardi, M., Mazza, D., & Zdancewic, S. (2014) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54833-8_19 · Cited by 90
“More interestingly, also the type system for sensitivity analysis from [35] and the one for non-interference analysis of the SLam calculus [20] can be seen as instances of our calculus.”
BackgroundJava Bytecode Verification: An Overview
Leroy, X. (2001) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-44585-4_26 · Cited by 74
Metadata
- Authors
- Heintze, N., & Riecke, J. G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL '98
- Publisher
- ACM Press
- Published
- 1998
- Pages
- 365-377
- OpenAlex
- W2016017569
- Cited by
- 410
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 22.88
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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