The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Sequence-aware Intrusion Detection in Industrial Control Systems
Open accessAbstract
Nowadays, several threats endanger cyber-physical systems. Among these systems, industrial control systems (ICS) operating on critical infrastructures have been proven to be an attractive target for attackers. The case of Stuxnet has not only showed that ICSs are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, but also that some of these attacks rely on understanding the processes beyond the employed systems and using such knowledge to maximize the damage. This concept is commonly known as "semantic attack". Our paper discusses a specific type of semantic attack involving "sequences of events". Common network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) generally search for single, unusual or "not permitted" operations. In our case, rather than a malicious event, we show how a specific series of "permitted" operations can elude standard intrusion detection systems and still damage an infrastructure. Moreover, we present a possible approach to the development of a sequence-aware intrusion detection system (S-IDS). We propose a S-IDS reference architecture and we discuss all the steps through its implementations. Finally, we test the S-IDS on real ICS traffic samples captured from a water treatment and purification facility.
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Cites
Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security
Stouffer, K., Pillitteri, V., Lightman, S., Abrams, M., & Hahn, A. (2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-82r2 · Cited by 1,377 · cited 1×
“Controllers (PLCs) [23].”
Accurate modeling of modbus/TCP for intrusion detection in SCADA systems
Goldenberg, N., & Wool, A. (2013) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.05.001 · Cited by 323 · cited 3×
“Goldenberg et al. [9] focus on a protocol (Modbus) and use a deterministic finite automaton ( ) to build a model from real traffic traces.”
Flow whitelisting in SCADA networks
Barbosa, R. R. R., Sadre, R., & Pras, A. (2013) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.08.003 · Cited by 90
Cited by
Security of smart manufacturing systems
Tuptuk, N., & Hailes, S. (2018) · Journal of Manufacturing Systems · doi:10.1016/j.jmsy.2018.04.007 · Cited by 456
Experimental assessment of network design approaches for protecting industrial control systems
Genge, B., Graur, F., & Haller, P. (2015) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2015.07.005 · Cited by 36
Kim, H., Kim, S., Jo, W., Kim, K.-H., & Shon, T. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3080081 · Cited by 14
Khan, M. I., Foley, S. N., & O’Sullivan, B. (2022) · Communications in Computer and Information Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-93956-4_11 · Cited by 10
Sicard, F., Zamai, É., & Flaus, J.-M. (2018) · Diagnosability, Security and Safety of Hybrid Dynamic and Cyber-Physical Systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-74962-4_5 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Caselli, M., Zambon, E., & Kargl, F.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2015-04-14
- Pages
- 13-24
- OpenAlex
- W2021702566
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 13.73
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Caselli, M., Zambon, E., & Kargl, F. (2015). Sequence-aware Intrusion Detection in Industrial Control Systems. Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2732198.2732200
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