PyCRA: Physical Challenge-Response Authentication For Active Sensors Under Spoofing Attacks
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Embedded sensing systems are pervasively used in life- and security-critical systems such as those found in airplanes, automobiles, and healthcare. Traditional security mechanisms for these sensors focus on data encryption and other post-processing techniques, but the sensors themselves often remain vulnerable to attacks in the physical/analog domain. If an adversary manipulates a physical/analog signal prior to digitization, no amount of digital security mechanisms after the fact can help. Fortunately, nature imposes fundamental constraints on how these analog signals can behave. This work presents PyCRA, a physical challenge-response authentication scheme designed to protect active sensing systems against physical attacks occurring in the analog domain. PyCRA provides secure active sensing by continually challenging the surrounding environment via random but deliberate physical probes. By analyzing the responses to these probes, the system is able to ensure that the underlying physics involved are not violated, providing an authentication mechanism that not only detects malicious attacks but provides resilience against them. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PyCRA in detecting and mitigating attacks through several case studies using two sensing systems: (1) magnetic sensors like those found on gear and wheel speed sensors in robotics and automotive, and (2) commercial Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags used in many security-critical applications. In doing so, we evaluate both the robustness and the limitations of the PyCRA security scheme, concluding by outlining practical considerations as well as further applications for the proposed authentication mechanism.
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Citations
Cites
Non-invasive Spoofing Attacks for Anti-lock Braking Systems
Shoukry, Y., Martin, P., Tabuada, P., & Srivastava, M. (2013) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40349-1_4 · Cited by 253
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Cited by
Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey
Humayed, A., Lin, J., Li, F., & Luo, B. (2017) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2703172 · Cited by 1,185
A survey of physics-based attack detection in cyber-physical systems
Giraldo, J., Urbina, D., Cardenas, A., Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Tippenhauer, N. O., Sandberg, H., & Candell, R. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3203245 · Cited by 535
“The idea of active monitoring has also been proposed in other domains [75, 93, 106, 107], as we will discuss later in the article.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialLimiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems
Urbina, D. I., Giraldo, J. A., Cardenas, A. A., Tippenhauer, N. O., Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Candell, R., & Sandberg, H. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978388 · Cited by 343
WALNUT: Waging Doubt on the Integrity of MEMS Accelerometers with Acoustic Injection Attacks
Trippel, T., Weisse, O., Xu, W., Honeyman, P., & Fu, K. (2017) · 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2017.42 · Cited by 279
Artificial Intelligence Security: Threats and Countermeasures
Hu, Y., Kuang, W., Qin, Z., Li, K., Zhang, J., Gao, Y., Li, W., & Li, K. (2023) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3487890 · Cited by 196
“…are covered Encryption or authentication Hardware-based datacollection Sensor spoofing attack [79, 131, 132, 135] Internet of Things Input filtering [173], Sensor enhancement and Baseband offset [133] collection technologies meet functional requirements but normally overlooked security goals.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Shoukry, Y., Martin, P., Yona, Y., Diggavi, S., & Srivastava, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2015-10-12
- Pages
- 1004-1015
- OpenAlex
- W2080611336
- Cited by
- 139
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.34
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Shoukry, Y., Martin, P., Yona, Y., Diggavi, S., & Srivastava, M. (2015). PyCRA: Physical Challenge-Response Authentication For Active Sensors Under Spoofing Attacks. Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813679
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