Artificial Intelligence Security: Threats and Countermeasures
Abstract
In recent years, with rapid technological advancement in both computing hardware and algorithm, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has demonstrated significant advantage over human being in a wide range of fields, such as image recognition, education, autonomous vehicles, finance, and medical diagnosis. However, AI-based systems are generally vulnerable to various security threats throughout the whole process, ranging from the initial data collection and preparation to the training, inference, and final deployment. In an AI-based system, the data collection and pre-processing phase are vulnerable to sensor spoofing attacks and scaling attacks, respectively, while the training and inference phases of the model are subject to poisoning attacks and adversarial attacks, respectively. To address these severe security threats against the AI-based systems, in this article, we review the challenges and recent research advances for security issues in AI, so as to depict an overall blueprint for AI security. More specifically, we first take the lifecycle of an AI-based system as a guide to introduce the security threats that emerge at each stage, which is followed by a detailed summary for corresponding countermeasures. Finally, some of the future challenges and opportunities for the security issues in AI will also be discussed.
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In the data collection phase of the AI life cycle, main security threats include databases, fake data, data breaches, and sensor attacks; defense strategies include data sanitization and data government.
“(1) data collection phase—main security threats include databases, fake data, data breaches, and sensor attacks; defense strategies include data sanitization and data government;”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
Hu et al present an overall framework of attacks and defense strategies based on five phases of the AI life cycle.
“Similarly, Hu et al [57] present an overall framework of attacks and defense strategies based on the following five phases of the AI life cycle:”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
In the data processing phase of the AI life cycle, image scaling is the main threat; recommended defense strategies include image reconstruction and data randomization.
“(2) data processing phase—image scaling is the main threat; recommended defense strategies include image reconstruction and data randomization;”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
Adversarial training uses carefully crafted adversarial examples to attack the training model to check for the integrity and robustness of outputs.
“The method uses carefully crafted adversarial examples to attack the training model to check for the integrity and robustness of outputs [57,79].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
Malicious parties also intensively explore adversarial training and use adversarial examples to attack training models to generate incorrect outcomes.
“By contrast, malicious parties also intensively explore this method and use adversarial examples to attack training models to generate incorrect outcomes [57].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
Modifying training processes and models as well as training methods may help to control AI risks in the model training and building phase.
“Modifying training processes and models as well as training methods may also help to control AI risks in this phase [57].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
Data standardization improves the quality of data collection.
“Data provenance and authentication metrics can be used to prevent collecting data from untrustworthy sources; detecting and filtering methods can be used to identify and filter poisoned data; and data standardization improves the quality of data collection [57].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
Health care AI systems, especially generative AI systems, are susceptible to code extraction and information extraction, leading to security and privacy breaches.
“Similar to other AI systems, health care AI systems, especially generative AI systems, are susceptible to code extraction and information extraction (eg, black-box, gray-box, and white-box attacks), leading to security and privacy breaches [57].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
Availability attacks such as denial of service can be used to flood conversational health AI applications to assess their resilience and availability before deployment, and integrity attacks with poisoned data can be used to test the stability of model performance and generalizability.
“For example, availability attacks such as denial of service can be used to flood conversational health AI applications to assess their resilience and availability before deployment, and integrity attacks with poisoned data can be used to test the stability of model performance and generalizability [57].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
AI systems interfacing with other hardware and software may face new security and privacy threats that have never existed before.
“In addition to AI-specific security and privacy threats, AI systems interfacing with other hardware and software may face new security and privacy threats that have never existed before [57].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [57]
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Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges
Chen, Y., & Esmaeilzadeh, P. (2024) · Journal of Medical Internet Research · doi:10.2196/53008 · Cited by 353 · see citing works
Agentic AI for Autonomous Cyber Threat Hunting and Adaptive Defense in Dynamic Security Environments
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- Authors
- Hu, Y., Kuang, W., Qin, Z., Li, K., Zhang, J., Gao, Y., Li, W., & Li, K.
- Affiliations
- Hunan University (CN)
- State University of New York (US)
- Nanjing University of Science and Technology (CN)
- New York Institute of Technology (US)
- Venue
- ACM Computing Surveys
- Published
- 2021-11-23
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-36
- ISSN
- 0360-0300 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7341
- OpenAlex
- W3215966579
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 10
- Citations by year
- 2026: 35 · 2025: 82 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 9
- FWCI
- 6.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM Computing Surveys (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (61872130, 62122023, U20A20202, 62002167, and 61874042)
- Science and Technology Project of Department of Communications of Hunan Provincial (201928)
- Hunan Natural Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars (2020JJ2010)
- Hunan Science and Technology Innovation Leading Talents Project (2021RC4019)
- Natural Science Foundation of Fujian Province (2021J01544)
- Key R & D Projects of Changsha (kq1907103)
- National Natural Science Foundation of JiangSu (BK20200461)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Keywords
- AI security, countermeasures, scaling attacks, poisoning attacks, adversarial attacks, AI lifecycle, model deployment
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