On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Bitcoin provides two incentives for miners: block rewards and transaction fees. The former accounts for the vast majority of miner revenues at the beginning of the system, but it is expected to transition to the latter as the block rewards dwindle. There has been an implicit belief that whether miners are paid by block rewards or transaction fees does not affect the security of the block chain.
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Citations
Cites
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From External to Internal Regret
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Cited by
Blockchain without waste: Proof-of-stake
Saleh, F. (2021) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaa075 · Cited by 825
Biais, B., Bisière, C., Bouvard, M., & Casamatta, C. (2019) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhy095 · Cited by 565
Daian, P., Goldfeder, S., Kell, T., Li, Y., Zhao, X., Bentov, I., Breidenbach, L., & Juels, A. (2020) · 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00040 · Cited by 482
Smart contract applications within blockchain technology: a systematic mapping study
Macrinici, D., Cartofeanu, C., & Gao, S. (2018) · Telematics and Informatics · doi:10.1016/j.tele.2018.10.004 · Cited by 458
“• Ethereum is the largest and most popular platform for building distributed applications, ranging from social networks and identity systems, to prediction markets and many types of financial applications (Colchester, 2018). • Bitcoin is both a system and a cryptocurrency that was first introduced by Nakamoto (2008).…”
BackgroundSoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi)
Werner, S., Perez, D., Gudgeon, L., Klages-Mundt, A., Harz, D., & Knottenbelt, W. (2022) · Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies · doi:10.1145/3558535.3559780 · Cited by 404
Metadata
- Authors
- Carlsten, M., Kalodner, H., Weinberg, S. M., & Narayanan, A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-10-24
- Pages
- 154-167
- OpenAlex
- W2535029869
- Cited by
- 328
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 29.06
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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