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SGX-Step: A Practical Attack Framework for Precise Enclave Execution Control

Open access
Van Bulck, Jo, Piessens, Frank, Strackx, Raoul·2017·Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution

Abstract

Protected module architectures such as Intel SGX hold the promise of protecting sensitive computations from a potentially compromised operating system. Recent research convincingly demonstrated, however, that SGX's strengthened adversary model also gives rise to to a new class of powerful, low-noise side-channel attacks leveraging first-rate control over hardware. These attacks commonly rely on frequent enclave preemptions to obtain fine-grained side-channel observations. A maximal temporal resolution is achieved when the victim state is measured after every instruction. Current state-of-the-art enclave execution control schemes, however, do not generally achieve such instruction-level granularity.

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Metadata

Authors
Van Bulck, J., Piessens, F., & Strackx, R.
Venue
Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution
Publisher
ACM
Published
2017-10-28
Pages
1-6
OpenAlex
W2769061097
Cited by
179
References
0
FWCI
7.37
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: SGX-Step: A Practical Attack Framework for Precise Enclave Execution Control. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3152701.3152706
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Van Bulck, J., Piessens, F., & Strackx, R. (2017). SGX-Step: A Practical Attack Framework for Precise Enclave Execution Control. Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution. https://doi.org/10.1145/3152701.3152706

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