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SGX-Step: A Practical Attack Framework for Precise Enclave Execution Control
Open accessAbstract
Protected module architectures such as Intel SGX hold the promise of protecting sensitive computations from a potentially compromised operating system. Recent research convincingly demonstrated, however, that SGX's strengthened adversary model also gives rise to to a new class of powerful, low-noise side-channel attacks leveraging first-rate control over hardware. These attacks commonly rely on frequent enclave preemptions to obtain fine-grained side-channel observations. A maximal temporal resolution is achieved when the victim state is measured after every instruction. Current state-of-the-art enclave execution control schemes, however, do not generally achieve such instruction-level granularity.
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Cited by
ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling
Schwarz, M., Lipp, M., Moghimi, D., Van Bulck, J., Stecklina, J., Prescher, T., & Gruss, D. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3354252 · Cited by 328
Self-citationSgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution
Chen, G., Chen, S., Xiao, Y., Zhang, Y., Lin, Z., & Lai, T. H. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00020 · Cited by 319
Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX
Murdock, K., Oswald, D., Garcia, F. D., Van Bulck, J., Gruss, D., & Piessens, F. (2020) · 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00057 · Cited by 314
Self-citationRIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load
van Schaik, S., Milburn, A., Osterlund, S., Frigo, P., Maisuradze, G., Razavi, K., Bos, H., & Giuffrida, C. (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00087 · Cited by 310
Raziel: Private and Verifiable Smart Contracts on Blockchains
Sánchez, D. C. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1807.09484 · Cited by 41
Metadata
- Authors
- Van Bulck, J., Piessens, F., & Strackx, R.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2017-10-28
- Pages
- 1-6
- OpenAlex
- W2769061097
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.37
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Van Bulck, J., Piessens, F., & Strackx, R. (2017). SGX-Step: A Practical Attack Framework for Precise Enclave Execution Control. Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution. https://doi.org/10.1145/3152701.3152706
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.