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SGX-Bomb: Locking Down the Processor via Rowhammer Attack

Open access
Jang, Yeongjin, Lee, Jaehyuk, Lee, Sangho, Kim, Taesoo · 2017 · Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution
Cited by 144

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides a strongly isolated memory space, known as an enclave, for a user process, ensuring confidentiality and integrity against software and hardware attacks. Even the operating system and hypervisor cannot access the enclave because of the hardware-level isolation. Further, hardware attacks are neither able to disclose plaintext data from the enclave because its memory is always encrypted nor modify it because its integrity is always verified using an integrity tree. When the processor detects any integrity violation, it locks itself to prevent further damages; that is, a system reboot is necessary. The processor lock seems a reasonable solution against such a powerful hardware attacker; however, if a software attacker has a way to trigger integrity violation, the lock could result in a severe denial-of-service (DoS) attack.

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Metadata

Authors
Jang, Y., Lee, J., Lee, S., & Kim, T.
Venue
Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution
Publisher
ACM
Published
2017-10-28
Pages
1-6
OpenAlex
W2769824527
Cited by
144
References
1
FWCI
5.59
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
gold

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: SGX-Bomb: Locking Down the Processor via Rowhammer Attack. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3152701.3152709
The paper
Jang, Y., Lee, J., Lee, S., & Kim, T. (2017). SGX-Bomb: Locking Down the Processor via Rowhammer Attack. Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution. https://doi.org/10.1145/3152701.3152709

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.