Securing SCADA Applications Using OpenPLC With End-To-End Encryption
Abstract
During its nascent stages, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) were made robust to sustain tough industrial environments, but little care was taken to raise defenses against potential cyberthreats. The recent interconnectivity of legacy PLCs and SCADA systems with corporate networks and the internet has significantly increased the threats to critical infrastructure. To counter these threats, researchers have put their efforts in finding defense mechanisms that can protect the SCADA network and the PLCs. Encryption is a critical component of security and therefore has been used by many organizations to protect data on the network. However, since PLC vendors don't make available information about their hardware or software, it becomes challenging to embed encryption into their devices, especially if they rely on legacy protocols. This paper describes an alternative design using an open source PLC that was modified to encrypt all data it sends over the network, independently of the protocol used. Experimental results indicated that the encryption layer increased the security of the link without causing a significant overhead.
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Numerous solutions have been proposed enhancing SCADA security within various domains of implementation, such as cyber attacks on cloud SCADA systems, end-to-end encryption between SCADA and Open PLC, and fuzzing SCADA protocols in smart grids.
“Furthermore, numerous solutions have been proposed, enhancing SCADA security within various domain of implementation, such as cyber attacks on cloud SCADA systems [184], end-to-end encryption between SCADA and Open PLC [185], fuzzing SCADA protocols in smart grids [186],”
From SCADA Systems With Focus on Continuous Manufacturing and Steel Industry: A Survey on Architectures, Standards, Challenges and Industry 5.0 (2022) · cites this paper as [184]
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“The work put forth by Fovino [9] describes a secure version of the Modbus SCADA protocol that incorporates integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and anti-replay mechanisms.”
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Sverko, M., Grbac, T. G., & Mikuc, M. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3211288 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
“…within various domain of implementation, such as cyber attacks on cloud SCADA systems [183], end-to-end encryption between SCADA and Open PLC [184], fuzzing SCADA protocols in smart grids [185], and cryptographic considerations addressing legacy structures using insecure communication…”
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- Authors
- Alves, T., Morris, T., & Yoo, S.-M.
- Affiliations
- University of Alabama in Huntsville (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2017-12-05
- Pages
- 1-6
- OpenAlex
- W2792743067
- Cited by
- 26
- References
- 8
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 2.51
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop (ICSS) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (1623657)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- SCADA security, programmable logic controller, OpenPLC, end-to-end encryption, industrial control systems, critical infrastructure protection, open-source hardware, network encryption, encryption overhead
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