Truth Will Out: Departure-Based Process-Level Detection of Stealthy Attacks on Control Systems
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent incidents have shown that Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are becoming increasingly susceptible to sophisticated and targeted attacks initiated by adversaries with high motivation, domain knowledge, and resources. Although traditional security mechanisms can be implemented at the IT-infrastructure level of such cyber-physical systems, the community has acknowledged that it is imperative to also monitor the process-level activity, as attacks on ICS may very well influence the physical process. In this paper, we present PASAD, a novel stealthy-attack detection mechanism that monitors time series of sensor measurements in real time for structural changes in the process behavior. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through simulations and experiments on data from real systems. Experimental results show that PASAD is capable of detecting not only significant deviations in the process behavior, but also subtle attack-indicating changes, significantly raising the bar for strategic adversaries who may attempt to maintain their malicious manipulation within the noise level.
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Cites
A plant-wide industrial process control problem
Downs, J. J., & Vogel, E. F. (1993) · Computers & Chemical Engineering · doi:10.1016/0098-1354(93)80018-i · Cited by 3,348 · cited 3×
“We have developed a set of new attacks on the Tennessee-Eastman process control model [12] that aim to cause tangible impact on the underlying physical process.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time
Paxson, V. (1999) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/s1389-1286(99)00112-7 · Cited by 2,636 · cited 1×
“Then, to capture and parse the traffic, we have built a packet-capturing subsystem on top of Bro [43] that features a dynamic buffering mechanism to deliver process data to pasad, after having parsed the packets and extracted the register data.”
MethodA Dataset to Support Research in the Design of Secure Water Treatment Systems
Goh, J., Adepu, S., Junejo, K. N., & Mathur, A. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71368-7_8 · Cited by 1,045 · cited 2×
“The SWaT dataset [16] is a collection of process readings and network traces from the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed.”
BackgroundMethodDeveloping a Hybrid Intrusion Detection System Using Data Mining for Power Systems
Pan, S., Morris, T., & Adhikari, U. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2015.2409775 · Cited by 457 · cited 1×
“[42] applied a so-called common path data mining technique on power system measurement data and audit logs that learns patterns and then classifies the system behavior over time into different scenarios.”
MethodChen, T. M., & Abu-Nimeh, S. (2011) · Computer · doi:10.1109/mc.2011.115 · Cited by 398
${l_p}$-norms in One-Class Classification for Intrusion Detection in SCADA Systems
Nader, P., Honeine, P., & Beauseroy, P. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2014.2330796 · Cited by 122
Cited by
Security of the Internet of Things: Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures
Butun, I., Osterberg, P., & Song, H. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2953364 · Cited by 707
Edge Intelligence: Empowering Intelligence to the Edge of Network
Xu, D., Li, T., Li, Y., Su, X., Tarkoma, S., Jiang, T., Crowcroft, J., & Hui, P. (2021) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2021.3119950 · Cited by 272
Kravchik, M., & Shabtai, A. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2021.3050101 · Cited by 224
Kus, D., Wagner, E., Pennekamp, J., Wolsing, K., Fink, I. B., Dahlmanns, M., Wehrle, K., & Henze, M. (2022) · Proceedings of the 8th ACM on Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop · doi:10.1145/3494107.3522773 · Cited by 28
Anomaly Detection based on Robust Spatial-temporal Modeling for Industrial Control Systems
Li, S., Liu, J., Pan, Z., Lv, S., Si, S., & Sun, L. (2022) · 2022 IEEE 19th International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Smart Systems (MASS) · doi:10.1109/mass56207.2022.00058 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Aoudi, W., Iturbe, M., & Almgren, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2018-10-15
- Pages
- 817-831
- OpenAlex
- W2890112720
- Cited by
- 106
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 19.31
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Aoudi, W., Iturbe, M., & Almgren, M. (2018). Truth Will Out: Departure-Based Process-Level Detection of Stealthy Attacks on Control Systems. Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243781
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