The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication
Open accessAbstract
Mobile communication networks connect much of the world's population. The security of users' calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose. We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol from the AKA family: 5G AKA. We also extract precise requirements from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing security goals. Using the security protocol verification tool Tamarin, we conduct a full, systematic, security evaluation of the model with respect to the 5G security goals. Our automated analysis identifies the minimal security assumptions required for each security goal and we find that some critical security goals are not met, except under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally, we make explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for the attacks and weaknesses we found.
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Cites
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The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols
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Self-citationA hierarchy of authentication specifications
Lowe, G. (2002) · Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop · doi:10.1109/csfw.1997.596782 · Cited by 630
Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif
Blanchet, B. (2016) · Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security · doi:10.1561/3300000004 · Cited by 321
Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems
Shaik, A., Borgaonkar, R., Asokan, N., Niemi, V., & Seifert, J.-P. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23236 · Cited by 277
Automated Analysis of Diffie-Hellman Protocols and Advanced Security Properties
Schmidt, B., Meier, S., Cremers, C., & Basin, D. (2012) · 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium · doi:10.1109/csf.2012.25 · Cited by 223
Self-citationLTEInspector: A Systematic Approach for Adversarial Testing of 4G LTE
Hussain, S. R., Chowdhury, O., Mehnaz, S., & Bertino, E. (2018) · Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2018.23313 · Cited by 213
Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate
Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., & Kobeissi, N. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.26 · Cited by 205
A Comprehensive Symbolic Analysis of TLS 1.3
Cremers, C., Horvat, M., Hoyland, J., Scott, S., & van der Merwe, T. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134063 · Cited by 199
Kobeissi, N., Bhargavan, K., & Blanchet, B. (2017) · IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2017.38 · Cited by 174
Cited by
Khan, R., Kumar, P., Jayakody, D. N. K., & Liyanage, M. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2933899 · Cited by 572
Security and Privacy for 6G: A Survey on Prospective Technologies and Challenges
Nguyen, V.-L., Lin, P.-C., Cheng, B.-C., Hwang, R.-H., & Lin, Y.-D. (2021) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2021.3108618 · Cited by 515
“Exploiting the vulnerability, an attacker can transfer his network bill to someone else for what he used on the SN [73].”
BackgroundMethodA Survey on Security Aspects for 3GPP 5G Networks
Cao, J., Ma, M., Li, H., Ma, R., Sun, Y., Yu, P., & Xiong, L. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2951818 · Cited by 272
SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Cremers, C., Liao, K., & Parno, B. (2021) · 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00008 · Cited by 143
Towards formal verification of IoT protocols: A Review
Hofer-Schmitz, K., & Stojanović, B. (2020) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107233 · Cited by 104
Hülsing, A., Ning, K.-C., Schwabe, P., Weber, F. J., & Zimmermann, P. R. (2021) · 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00030 · Cited by 75
Fernandes, T., Magalhães, J. P., & Alves, W. (2025) · Green Energy and Intelligent Transportation · doi:10.1016/j.geits.2025.100305 · Cited by 23
FIDO Gets Verified: A Formal Analysis of the Universal Authentication Framework Protocol
Feng, H., Guan, J., Li, H., Pan, X., & Zhao, Z. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2022.3217259 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Basin, D., Dreier, J., Hirschi, L., Radomirovic, S., Sasse, R., & Stettler, V.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2018-10-15
- Pages
- 1383-1396
- OpenAlex
- W2809727329
- Cited by
- 412
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 33.21
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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